Subjective Performance Evaluations, Self-esteem, and Ego-threats in Principal-agent Relations
AbstractWe conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on and principals benefiting from a real effort task in which the agents’ effort/performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. We find that agents sanction whenever the feedback of principals is below their subjective self-evaluations even if the agents’ payoff is independent of the principals’ feedback. Based on our experimental analysis we propose a principal-agent model with subjective performance evaluations that accommodates this finding. We analyze the agents’ (optimal) behavior, optimal contracts, and social welfare in this environment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 10-18.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2010
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
contracts; subjective performance evaluations; self-esteem; ego-threats;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-09-03 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2010-09-03 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2010-09-03 (Experimental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2006.
"Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5768, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2008. "Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 990-1008, June.
- Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2004.
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1536-1557, December.
- Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003. "Confidence-Enhanced Performance," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-009, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Confidence-Enhanced Performance," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-023, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 May 2003.
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