This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Pure Redistribution and the Provision of Public Goods

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Rupert Sausgruber (Department of Public Economics, University of Innsbruck)
Jean-Robert Tyran (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We study pure redistribution as a device to increase cooperation and efficiency in the provision of public goods. Experimental subjects play a two-stage game. The first stage is the standard linear public goods game. In the second stage, subjects can redistribute payoffs among other subjects in their group. We find that cooperation and efficiency increases substantially with this redistribution scheme, and that the redistribution option is popular. Our results provide an intuitive explanation for why an imposed redistribution rule, as proposed by Falkinger (1996), is capable of sustaining cooperation in the provision of public goods.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/Research/Publications/pink/2006/0624.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 06-24.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0624

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Studiestraede 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K., Denmark
Phone: (+45) 35 32 26 26
Fax: +45 35 32 30 00
Web page: http://www.econ.ku.dk
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Henriette Aabo Hansen).

Related research
Keywords: experiment public goods redistribution

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Martin Sefton & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2006. "The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods," Caepr Working Papers 2006-005, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington, revised Aug 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers iewwp010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Josef Falkinger et al., 2000. "A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 247-264, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Talbot Page & Louis Putterman & Bruno Garcia, 2008. "Getting Punnishment Right: Do Costly Monitoring or Redustributive Punishment Help?," Working Papers 2008-1, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS uses the data collected within the RePEc project, the largest online bibliographic database in Economics.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-27.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.