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The Changing of the Guards: Can Physicians Contain Social Insurance Costs?

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Author Info

  • Markussen, Simen

    ()
    (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research)

  • Røed, Knut

    ()
    (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research)

  • Røgeberg, Ole J.

    ()
    (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research)

Abstract

Based on administrative data from Norway, we examine the extent to which family doctors influence their clients' propensity to claim sick pay and disability benefits. The analysis is based on exogenous shifts of family doctors occurring when physicians quit, retire, or for other reasons sell their patient lists to other doctors. Our key finding is that family doctors have significant influence on their clients' benefit claims. We conclude that it is possible for family doctors to contain social insurance costs to some extent, and that there is a significant variation across doctors in the way they do so.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 7122.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7122

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Related research

Keywords: gatekeepers; absence certification; disability insurance; sick pay;

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References

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  1. Kurt R. Brekke & Robert Nuscheler & Odd Rune Straume, 2005. "Gatekeeping in Health Care," CESifo Working Paper Series 1552, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Dusheiko, Mark & Gravelle, Hugh & Jacobs, Rowena & Smith, Peter, 2006. "The effect of financial incentives on gatekeeping doctors: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 449-478, May.
  3. Markussen, Simen, 2009. "The Effects of Sick-Leaves on Earnings," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics 20/2009, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  4. Grytten, Jostein & Sorensen, Rune, 2003. "Practice variation and physician-specific effects," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 403-418, May.
  5. Nicole Maestas & Kathleen Mullen & Alexander Strand, 2012. "Does Disability Insurance Receipt Discourage Work? Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of SSDI Receipt," Working Papers, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center wp241, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center.
  6. Blomqvist, Ake, 1991. "The doctor as double agent: Information asymmetry, health insurance, and medical care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 411-432.
  7. Scott, Anthony, 2000. "Economics of general practice," Handbook of Health Economics, Elsevier, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1175-1200 Elsevier.
  8. Duggan, Mark, 2005. "Do new prescription drugs pay for themselves?: The case of second-generation antipsychotics," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 1-31, January.
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