Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Competition in general practice: Prescriptions to the elderly in a list patient system

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kann, Inger Cathrine
  • Biørn, Erik
  • Lurås, Hilde

Abstract

Income motivation among general practitioners (GPs) is frequently discussed in the health economics literature. The question addressed in the present study on reimbursement drugs and addictive drugs is whether increased competition among GPs, which is part of a declared health policy to improve efficiency, contributes to more prescriptions for the elderly. The dataset comprises registered data of all prescribed drugs dispensed at pharmacies from the Norwegian Prescription Database merged with data on GPs. In choosing a method, particular attention is given to the fact that patients tend to be attracted to GPs who fit their preferences. Hence, we treat the composition of the patient list as endogenous. The results indicate that the stronger competition a GP faces, the more drugs are prescribed, which implies that GPs' prescription style may conflict with their role as gatekeepers, and even worse, it may be a hazard to patients' health.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8K-50JHBNX-1/2/0acdf74194246ae8ceebd36f227db30d
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.

Volume (Year): 29 (2010)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 751-764

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:29:y:2010:i:5:p:751-764

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560

Related research

Keywords: General practitioner Gatekeeper Prescription Competition Panel data;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Carlsen, Benedicte & Nyborg, Karine, 2009. "The Gate is Open: Primary Care Physicians as Social Security Gatekeepers," Memorandum 07/2009, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  2. Anthony Scott & Alan Shiell, 1997. "Analysing the effect of competition on General Practitioners' behaviour using a multilevel modelling framework," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 6(6), pages 577-588.
  3. Iversen, Tor & Luras, Hilde, 2000. "Economic motives and professional norms: the case of general medical practice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 447-470, December.
  4. Blomqvist, Ake, 1991. "The doctor as double agent: Information asymmetry, health insurance, and medical care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 411-432.
  5. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
  6. Hausman, Jerry A. & Taylor, William E., 1981. "Panel data and unobservable individual effects," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 155-155, May.
  7. McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Physician agency," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 461-536 Elsevier.
  8. Scott, Anthony, 2000. "Economics of general practice," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1175-1200 Elsevier.
  9. Godager, Geir & Iversen, Tor & Ma , Ching-To Albert, 2009. "Service motives and profit incentives among physicans," HERO On line Working Paper Series 2007:4, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme.
  10. Grytten, Jostein & Sørensen, Rune, 2008. "Busy physicians," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 510-518, March.
  11. Iversen, Tor, 2004. "The effects of a patient shortage on general practitioners' future income and list of patients," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 673-694, July.
  12. Hausman, Jerry A & Taylor, William E, 1981. "Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1377-98, November.
  13. Breusch, Trevor S & Mizon, Grayham E & Schmidt, Peter, 1989. "Efficient Estimation Using Panel Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 695-700, May.
  14. Hsiao,Cheng, 2003. "Analysis of Panel Data," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521522717.
  15. Iversen, Tor & Lurås, Hilde, 2009. "The importance of micro-data for revaealing income motivated behaviour among GPs," HERO On line Working Paper Series 1999:3, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Iversen, Tor & Lurås, Hilde, 2011. "Patient switching in general practice," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 894-903.
  2. Fiorentini, Gianluca & Lippi Bruni, Matteo & Ugolini, Cristina, 2013. "GPs and hospital expenditures. Should we keep expenditure containment programs alive?," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 10-20.
  3. E. Iezzi & M. Lippi Bruni & C. Ugolini, 2011. "The role of GP’s compensation schemes in diabetes care: evidence from panel data," Working Papers wp766, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:29:y:2010:i:5:p:751-764

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.