We develop a principal-agent model in which the health authority acts as a principal for both a patient and a general practitioner (GP). The goal of the paper is to weigh the merits of gatekeeping versus non-gatekeeping approaches to health care when patient selfhealth information and patient pressure on GPs to provide referrals for specialized care are considered. We find that, when GPs incentives matter, a non-gatekeeping system is preferable only when (i) patient pressure to refer is sufficiently high and (ii) the quality of the patient’s self-health information is neither highly inaccurate (in which case the patient's self-referral will very inefficient) nor highly accurate (in which case the GP’s agency problem will be very costly).
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by FEDEA in its series Working Papers with number
2008-05.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Brekke, Kurt R. & Nuscheler, Robert & Straume, Odd Rune, 2007.
"Gatekeeping in health care,"
Journal of Health Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 149-170, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Scott, Anthony, 2000.
"Economics of general practice,"
Handbook of Health Economics,
in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1175-1200
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)