The "gatekeeping" role of general practitioners. Does patients' information matter ?
AbstractWe deal with a principal-agent model in which the health authority acts as a principal for both a patient and a General Practitioner (GP). In this framework, we study the role of GPs as filters for secondary care, emphasizing the implications that patients' information may have for health authorities. We derive the GP's payment contract that induces him to perform diagnosis and follow its recommendation, as well as the level of copayments that provide patients with incentives to select the appropriate medical provider. We show that when patients can freely choose their provider, the quality of their information has contradictory effects. The higher this quality is, the lower the expected losses the patient bears. A higher quality, however, worsens the GP's agency problem, as GPs have more incentives to use patients' information as a substitute for their own diagnosis. We also analyze the role of patients' pressure for referral on the choice of the optimal system to access secondary care.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2003089.
Date of creation: 00 Dec 2003
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general practice; incentives; patients’ beliefs; patients’ pressure; referrals;
Other versions of this item:
- Paula González, 2006. "The Gatekeeping Role of General Practitioners. Does Patients' Information Matter?," Working Papers 06.09, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Odd Rune Straume & Kurt Brekke & Robert Nuscheler, 2004. "Gatekeeping In Health Care," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 83, Royal Economic Society.
- Kurt R. Brekke & Robert Nuscheler & Odd Rune Straume, 2005. "Gatekeeping in Health Care," CESifo Working Paper Series 1552, CESifo Group Munich.
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"Market Conditions and General Practitioners' Referrals,"
Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
wp2009-009, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Tor Iversen & Ching-to Ma, 2011. "Market conditions and general practitioners’ referrals," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 245-265, December.
- Ching-to Albert MA & Tor Iversen, 2010. "Market conditions and general practitioners’ referrals," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2010-023, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Iversen, Tor & Ma, Albert, 2009. "Market Conditions and General Practitioners’ Referrals," HERO On line Working Paper Series 2009:8, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme.
- Odd Rune Straume & Kurt Brekke & Robert Nuscheler, 2004.
"Gatekeeping In Health Care,"
Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004
83, Royal Economic Society.
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