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Incentives and the Allocation of Effort Over Time: The Joint Role of Affective and Cognitive Decision Making

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Author Info
Lorenz Goette () (University of Zurich, CEPR and IZA Bonn)
David Huffman () (IZA Bonn)

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Abstract

We use natural experiments - plausibly exogenous, anticipated increases in the piece rate - to study how effort responds to incentives. Our first finding, like some previous studies, lends little support to the view that incentives increase effort: raising the piece rate has zero effect on total daily effort. Previous studies have speculated that changes in motivation over the course of the workday, caused by the increase in the piece rate, may lead to this result, but have relied on data aggregated to the day. Our data allow us to look within the workday. We find that workers do respond to incentives within the day: they work significantly harder in early hours of work, but significantly less hard later on, with a net effect of zero on total daily effort. We consider different possible explanations for this behavior. The most parsimonious explanation is a model in the spirit of Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2005), in which a cognitive system, assumed to behave like the standard economic model predicts, is in conflict with the affective system. We review evidence from psychology and neuroscience to argue that the affective system may be strongly influenced by within-day changes in earnings, relative to an earnings goal. The affective system cares less about income once the goal is surpassed, providing an explanation for a drop in effort later in the day, and for the findings of earlier studies.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2400.

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Length: 62 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2006
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Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2400

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Related research
Keywords: labor supply; loss aversion; affect; intertemporal substitution;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
B49 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Other

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    Other versions:
  5. Botond Koszegi & Matthew Rabin, 2005. "A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000341, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Loewenstein, George & Thaler, Richard H, 1989. "Intertemporal Choice," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 181-93, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Benhabib, Jess & Bisin, Alberto, 2005. "Modeling internal commitment mechanisms and self-control: A neuroeconomics approach to consumption-saving decisions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 460-492, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Henry S. Farber, 2005. "Is Tomorrow Another Day? The Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(1), pages 46-82, February.
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  17. George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2003. "Projection Bias In Predicting Future Utility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(4), pages 1209-1248, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. John G. Treble, 2003. "Intertemporal Substitution of Effort: Some Empirical Evidence," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 70(280), pages 579-595, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Bruce Shearer, 2004. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(2), pages 513-534, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Honekamp, Ivonne, 2007. "High Wages - An instrument inducing workers to work more?," MPRA Paper 15847, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
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