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Competition and fatigue

Author

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  • Angelova, Vera
  • Giebe, Thomas
  • Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta

Abstract

We study how subjects deal with fatigue in a sequence of tournaments that are linked through fatigue spillovers. We develop a model that allows us to predict the consequences of varying the severity of competition as well as the ease of recovery over time. Even in the presence of fatigue, effort should positively respond to an increase in incentives in a single tournament. A less obvious consequence is the need for strategic resting before and after that tournament. We test our theory using a chosen-effort experiment. While an increase in incentives in the second of three tournaments does lead to higher effort in that tournament, we observe only a tendency for the predicted strategic resting before and after. The increase in incentives does not yield the predicted higher total effort. When recovery is made harder, effort responds negatively as predicted. We complement our study with a real-effort task. Subjects seem to have difficulties simultaneously dealing with physical fatigue as well as the cognitive problem of allocating effort over time.

Suggested Citation

  • Angelova, Vera & Giebe, Thomas & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta, 2022. "Competition and fatigue," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 198(C), pages 236-249.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:198:y:2022:i:c:p:236-249
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.03.032
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentives; Fatigue; Recovery; Tournament; Theory; Experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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