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Legal Default Rules: The Case of Wrongful Discharge Laws

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  • MacLeod, W. Bentley

    ()
    (Columbia University)

  • Nakavachara, Voraprapa

    ()
    (University of Southern California)

Abstract

One of the most vexing public policy issues is the extent to which governments should intervene into private contractual relationships. The purpose of this paper is to explore both theoretically and empirically the extent to which such interventions may enhance efficiency. In the case of employment law, economists have traditionally taken the view that intervention, such as protection against wrongful discharge, simply undoes the original intent of the parties to the agreement. We find that both the good faith and the implied contract exceptions to employment at will may enhance employment in occupations characterized by high levels of investment. These results suggest that under the appropriate conditions courts may enhance the operation of a competitive market by setting appropriate default remedies for breach of contract.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1970.

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Length: 56 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Economic Journal, 2007, 117 (521), F218-F278
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1970

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Keywords: employment law; wrongful discharge; private contracts; default rules;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Falk, Armin & Huffman, David B. & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2008. "Institutions and Contract Enforcement," IZA Discussion Papers 3435, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Autor, David & Kerr, William & Kugler, Adriana, 2007. "Do Employment Protections Reduce Productivity? Evidence from U.S. States," IZA Discussion Papers 2571, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. ANT Bozkaya & William R. Kerr, 2009. "Labor Regulations and European Private Equity," Working Papers CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles 09-055.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  4. Bruno Deffains & Dominique Demougin, 2006. "Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2006-027, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.

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