Exceptions to Employment at Will: Raising Firing Costs or Enforcing Life-Cycle Contracts?
AbstractThe common law doctrine of employment at will holds that, unless specified otherwise, the employment relationship can be terminated for any reason. Beginning in the mid-1970s, many state courts became willing to find exceptions to this doctrine. A possible benefit of this new approach is that it provides a third-party enforcement mechanism to implicit labor contracts. This article uses two large micro data sets on employee tenure and wages to evaluate the impact of exceptions to employment at will. Although the results suggest that exceptions to employment at will affected labor markets, there is little evidence that exceptions helped enforce implicit contracts. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal American Law and Economics Review.
Volume (Year): 5 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://www.aler.oupjournals.org/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Autor, David & Kerr, William & Kugler, Adriana, 2007.
"Do Employment Protections Reduce Productivity? Evidence from U.S. States,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2571, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- William Kerr & Adriana Kugler & David Autor, 2007. "Do Employment Protections Reduce Productivity? Evidence from U.S. States," Working Papers 07-04, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
- David H. Autor & William R. Kerr & Adriana D. Kugler, 2007. "Do Employment Protections Reduce Productivity? Evidence from U.S. States," Harvard Business School Working Papers 07-048, Harvard Business School.
- David H. Autor & William R. Kerr & Adriana D. Kugler, 2007. "Do Employment Protections Reduce Productivity? Evidence from U.S. States," NBER Working Papers 12860, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- W. Bentley MacLeod & Voraprapa Nakavachara, 2006.
"Legal default rules: The case of wrongful discharge laws,"
0506-19, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- MacLeod, W. Bentley & Nakavachara, Voraprapa, 2006. "Legal Default Rules: The Case of Wrongful Discharge Laws," IZA Discussion Papers 1970, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Benito Arruñada & Veneta Andonova, 2004.
"Judges' cognition and market order,"
Economics Working Papers
768, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2008.
- Viral V. Acharya & Ramin P. Baghai & Krishnamurthy V. Subramanian, 2014.
"Wrongful Discharge Laws and Innovation,"
Review of Financial Studies,
Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(1), pages 301-346, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.