IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ehsrev/v71y2018i1p267-289.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

From the substance to the shadow: the role of the court in Japanese labour markets

Author

Listed:
  • Masaki Nakabayashi

Abstract

Modern contract law generally does not allow property rights or similar claims to be made against employees. This undermines a claim on the return on the employer's investments in recruiting and training a worker, making them vulnerable to possible infringement from a bystander. Accordingly, employers’ investment in recruiting and training might become deficient. Therefore, protecting an employer's investment, balanced against the mobility of the labour market for better employer/employee matches, has emerged as an issue during the transition towards a market†based economy. This article explores how the Japanese state court in its early period addressed this issue in the tight labour market of the silk†reeling industry, which was the leading industry at that time. Initially, the court directly protected the interests of employers whose employees were poached, at the expense of workers’ mobility. Then, it seemed to govern transactions between employers indirectly as a shadow off†the†equilibrium path. Thus, an employer whose employee was poached and an employer who carried out the poaching would privately negotiate to settle the dispute, using a possible suit as a threat against the poacher. An examination of the suits that were actually filed supports this hypothesis. This indirect governance facilitated labour market mobility with some protection of the original employer's claim.

Suggested Citation

  • Masaki Nakabayashi, 2018. "From the substance to the shadow: the role of the court in Japanese labour markets," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 71(1), pages 267-289, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ehsrev:v:71:y:2018:i:1:p:267-289
    DOI: 10.1111/ehr.12432
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.12432
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/ehr.12432?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Galenson, David W, 1981. "The Market Evaluation of Human Capital: The Case of Indentured Servitude," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(3), pages 446-467, June.
    2. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, 2006. "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws and Family Distress," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 121(1), pages 267-288.
    3. Masaki Nakabayashi, 2014. "Imposed Efficiency of Treaty Ports: Japanese Industrialization and Western Imperialist Institutions," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 254-271, May.
    4. Federico,Giovanni, 2009. "An Economic History of the Silk Industry, 1830–1930," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521105262.
    5. Max Schanzenbach, 2003. "Exceptions to Employment at Will: Raising Firing Costs or Enforcing Life-Cycle Contracts?," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 470-504, August.
    6. Grubb, Farley, 1985. "The Market for Indentured Immigrants: Evidence on the Efficiency of Forward-Labor Contracting in Philadelphia, 1745–1773," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(4), pages 855-868, December.
    7. Hanes, Christopher, 1996. "Turnover Cost and the Distribution of slave Labor in Anglo-America," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 307-329, June.
    8. Niko Matouschek & Paolo Ramezzana, 2007. "The Role Of Exclusive Contracts In Facilitating Market Transactions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 347-371, June.
    9. Suresh Naidu & Noam Yuchtman, 2013. "Coercive Contract Enforcement: Law and the Labor Market in Nineteenth Century Industrial Britain," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 107-144, February.
    10. Hicks, J. R., 1969. "A Theory of Economic History," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198811633, Decembrie.
    11. Albert Choi & George Triantis, 2008. "Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(2), pages 503-534, June.
    12. Suresh Naidu, 2010. "Recruitment Restrictions and Labor Markets: Evidence from the Postbellum U.S. South," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 413-445, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gutmann, Jerg & Voigt, Stefan, 2020. "Traditional law in times of the nation state: why is it so prevalent?," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(4), pages 445-461, August.
    2. Nakabayashi, Masaki, 2019. "From family security to the welfare state: Path dependency of social security on the difference in legal origins," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 280-293.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. NAKABAYASHI, Masaki, 2014. "From the Substance to the Shadow: The Court Embedded into Japanese Labor Markets," ISS Discussion Paper Series (series F) f168, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, revised 28 Mar 2014.
    2. NAKABAYASHI, Masaki, 2009. "Poaching, Courts, and Settlements:Complementarity of Governance in Labor Markets," ISS Discussion Paper Series (series F) f145, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, revised 01 Mar 2012.
    3. Geloso, Vincent & Kufenko, Vadim & Arsenault-Morin, Alex P., 2023. "The lesser shades of labor coercion: The impact of seigneurial tenure in nineteenth-century Quebec," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    4. Gillian Hamilton, 1999. "The Decline of Apprenticeship in North America: Evidence from Montreal," Working Papers hamiltng-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    5. Grubb, Farley, 2000. "The Statutory Regulation of Colonial Servitude: An Incomplete-Contract Approach," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 42-75, January.
    6. Mathias Hoffmann & Toshihiro Okubo, 2012. "By a Silken Thread: regional banking integration and pathways to financial development in Japan's Great Recession," Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series 2012-021, Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program.
    7. Suresh Naidu & Yaw Nyarko & Shing-Yi Wang, 2016. "Monopsony Power in Migrant Labor Markets: Evidence from the United Arab Emirates," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(6), pages 1735-1792.
    8. Melissa Rubio-Ramos, 2022. "From Plantations to Prisons: The Race Gap in Incarceration After the Abolition of Slavery in the U.S," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 195, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    9. Suresh Naidu & Yaw Nyarko & Shing-Yi Wang, 2014. "Worker Mobility in a Global Labor Market: Evidence from the United Arab Emirates," NBER Working Papers 20388, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Dari-Mattiacci Giuseppe & de Oliveira Guilherme, 2021. "Slavery versus Labor," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 495-568, November.
    11. Guimaraes, Bernardo & Cordeiro De Noronha Pessoa, Joao Paulo & Ponczek, Vladimir, 2021. "Non-compete agreements, wages and efficiency: theory and evidence from Brazilian football," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 114417, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    12. Diego Battiston & Miguel Espinosa & Shuo Liu, 2021. "Talent Poaching and Job Rotation," Working Papers 1237, Barcelona School of Economics.
    13. Ran Abramitzky & Leah Boustan, 2017. "Immigration in American Economic History," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(4), pages 1311-1345, December.
    14. Tyrefors, Björn & Lindgren, Erik & Pettersson-Lidbom, Per, 2017. "The Political Economics of Growth, Labor Control and Coercion: Evidence from a Suffrage Reform," Working Paper Series 1172, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 24 Sep 2019.
    15. Saleh, Mohamed, 2022. "Trade, Slavery, and State Coercion of Labor: Egypt During the First Globalization Era," CEPR Discussion Papers 14542, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Evan Starr, 2019. "Consider This: Training, Wages, and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 72(4), pages 783-817, August.
    17. Akin A. Cilekoglu, 2023. ""Labor Market Monopsony and Firm Behavior: Evidence from Spanish Exporters"," IREA Working Papers 202307, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Jul 2023.
    18. Anna Sokolova & Todd Sorensen, 2021. "Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Meta-Analysis," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 74(1), pages 27-55, January.
    19. Michael Baker & Gillian Hamilton, 1999. "French/English Differences in Labour Market Compensation in 19th Century Montreal," Working Papers baker-99-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    20. Muller, Christopher & Schrage, Daniel, 2019. "The Political Economy of Incarceration in the Cotton South, 1910-1925," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt7nb8p8bx, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ehsrev:v:71:y:2018:i:1:p:267-289. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ehsukea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.