Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Regulating Concessions of Toll Motorways, An Empirical Study on Fixed vs. Variable Term Contracts

Contents:

Author Info

  • Daniel Albalate

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona)

  • Germa Bel

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona)

Abstract

Recent theoretical developments on concession contracts for long term infrastructure projects under uncertain demand show the benefits of allowing for flexible term contracts rather than fixing a rigid term. This study presents a simulation to compare both alternatives by using real data from the oldest Spanish toll motorway. For this purpose, we analyze how well the flexible term would have performed instead of the fixed length actually established. Our results show a huge reduction of the term of concession that would have dramatically decreased the firm’s benefits and the user’s overpayment due to the internalization of an unexpected traffic increase.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2007/200706.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Alicia García)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics in its series IREA Working Papers with number 200706.

as in new window
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2007
Date of revision: Mar 2007
Handle: RePEc:ira:wpaper:200706

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, Num 1-11 08034 Barcelona
Web page: http://www.ub.edu/irea/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Toll motorways; privatization; concessions; regulation.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Ubbels, Barry & Verhoef, Erik T., 2008. "Auctioning concessions for private roads," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 155-172, January.
  2. Chen, Anthony & Subprasom, Kitti, 2007. "Analysis of regulation and policy of private toll roads in a build-operate-transfer scheme under demand uncertainty," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 537-558, July.
  3. Bel, Germi & Fageda, Xavier, 2005. "Is a Mixed Funding Model for the Highway Network Sustainable Over Time The Spanish Case," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 187-203, January.
  4. Hinojosa, Sergio & Gomez-Lobo, Andres, 2000. "Broad roads in a thin country - infrastructure concessions in Chile," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2279, The World Bank.
  5. Eduardo M.R.A. Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2003. "Privatizing Highways in Latin America: Is It Possible to Fix What Went Wrong?," Working Papers 866, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
  6. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 1997. "Highway Franchising: Pitfalls and Opportunities," Documentos de Trabajo 15, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  7. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 1998. "Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising," Documentos de Trabajo 37, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  8. de Palma, André & Kilani, Moez & Lindsey, Robin, 2005. "Congestion pricing on a road network: A study using the dynamic equilibrium simulator METROPOLIS," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 39(7-9), pages 588-611.
  9. Antonio Estache & Ginés de Rus, 2000. "Privatization and Regulation of Transport Infrastructures: Guidelines for Policymakers and Regulators," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/44116, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  10. J. Luis Guasch, 2004. "Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions : Doing it Right," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15024.
  11. Vickrey, William S, 1969. "Congestion Theory and Transport Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 251-60, May.
  12. Robinson, James A & Torvik, Ragnar, 2002. "White Elephants," CEPR Discussion Papers 3459, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Holgui­n-Veras, Jose & Cetin, Mecit & Xia, Shuwen, 2006. "A comparative analysis of US toll policy," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 852-871, December.
  14. José M. Vassallo, 2006. "Traffic Risk Mitigation in Highway Concession Projects: The Experience of Chile," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and University of Bath, vol. 40(3), pages 359-381, September.
  15. Daniel Albalate & Germa Bel & Xavier Fageda, 2007. "Privatization and regulation of toll motorways in europe," IREA Working Papers 200704, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Mar 2007.
  16. Nombela, Gustavo & de Rus, Ginés, 2004. "Flexible-term contracts for road franchising," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 163-179, March.
  17. Nakamura, Katsuhiko & Kockelman, Kara Maria, 2002. "Congestion pricing and roadspace rationing: an application to the San Francisco Bay Bridge corridor," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 403-417, June.
  18. Ginés de Rus & Manuel Romero, 2004. "Private financing of roads and optimal pricing: Is it possible to get both?," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 485-497, 09.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ira:wpaper:200706. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alicia García).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.