Post-Resolution Treatment of Depositors At Failed Banks: Implications for the Severity of Banking Crises, Systemic Risk, and too-Big-To-Fail
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Eric Santor, 2003. "Crisis bancarias y contagio: evidencia empírica," Monetaria, CEMLA, vol. 0(3), pages 293-344, julio-sep.
- Eric Santor, 2003. "Banking Crises and Contagion: Empirical Evidence," Staff Working Papers 03-1, Bank of Canada.
- Marília Pinheiro Ohlson & Gerlando Augusto Sampaio Franco de Lima & Tony Takeda, 2021. "Deposit insurance and brokerage firms: impacts on the market discipline of the Brazilian banking industry," Working Papers Series 542, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
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More about this item
Keywords
WP; uninsured depositor; depositor monitoring; unprotected depositor; insurance agency; access delay time.; depositor discipline; depositor pressure; deposit insurance; bank failure; banking crisis; systemic risk; delay time; bailout pressure; depositor access; depositor ownership; Distressed institutions; Bank solvency; Bank deposits; Bank resolution;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-NET-2001-11-27 (Network Economics)
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