Post-resolution treatment of depositors at failed banks: implications for the severity of banking crises, systemic risk, and too big to fail
AbstractLosses from bank failures have significant adverse implications for bank stakeholders, as well as for the macroeconomy. This article examines the potential sources of such losses, in particular the losses that may occur after the date a bank is failed, and makes recommendations on how to minimize these losses.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in its journal Economic Perspectives.
Volume (Year): (2002)
Issue (Month): Q II ()
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