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Agency problems and risk taking at banks

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Author Info
Rebecca S. Demsetz
Marc R. Saidenberg
Philip E. Strahan
Abstract

The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance generates the potential for excessive risk taking on the part of bank owners. The banking literature identifies franchise value -- a firm’s profit-generating potential -- as one force mitigating that risk taking. We argue that in the presence of owner/manager agency problems, managerial risk aversion may also offset the excessive risk taking that stems from moral hazard. Empirical models of bank risk tend to focus either on the disciplinary role of franchise value or on owner/manager agency problems. We estimate a unified model and find that both franchise value and ownership structure affect risk at banks. More important, we identify an interesting interaction effect: The relationship between ownership structure and risk is significant only at low franchise value banks -- those where moral hazard problems are most severe and where conflicts between owner and manager risk preferences are therefore strongest. Risk is lower at banks with no insider holdings, but among other banks, there is no relationship between the level of insider holdings and risk. This suggests that the owner/manager agency problem affects the choice of risk for only a small number of banks -- those with low franchise value and no insider holdings. Most of these banks increase their insider holdings within a year, and these changes in ownership structure are associated with increased risk. This suggests that owner/manager agency problems are quickly addressed.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its series Staff Reports with number 29.

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Date of creation: 1997
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:29

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Keywords: Bank management ; Deposit insurance ; Risk;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Stephen Prowse, 1995. "Alternative methods of corporate control in commercial banks," Working Papers 95-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. [Downloadable!]
  3. Galloway, Tina M. & Lee, Winson B. & Roden, Dianne M., 1997. "Banks' changing incentives and opportunities for risk taking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 509-527, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Elijah Brewer, III & Marc R. Saidenberg, 1996. "Franchise value, ownership structure, and risk at savings institutions," Research Paper 9632, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  5. Houston, Joel F. & James, Christopher, 1995. "CEO compensation and bank risk Is compensation in banking structured to promote risk taking?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 405-431, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Rebecca S. Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, 1996. "Banks with something to lose: the disciplinary role of franchise value," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 1-14. [Downloadable!]
  8. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1997. "The Political Economy of Deregulation: Evidence From the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions in the United States," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 136, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  9. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1997. "The political economy of deregulation: evidence from the relaxation of bank branching restrictions in the United States," Research Paper 9720, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  12. John H. Boyd & Mark Gertler, 1994. "Are banks dead? or, are the reports greatly exaggerated?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 85-117.
    Other versions:
  13. Berger, Allen N & Udell, Gregory F, 1995. "Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(3), pages 351-81, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Edward J. Kane & Haluk Unal, 1988. "Change in Market Assessments of Deposit-Institution Riskiness," NBER Working Papers 2530, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Gorton, Gary & Rosen, Richard, 1995. " Corporate Control, Portfolio Choice, and the Decline of Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1377-1420, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Stephen D. Prowse, 1995. "Alternative methods of corporate control in commercial banks," Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue Q III, pages 24-36. [Downloadable!]
  17. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. " The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Saunders, Anthony & Strock, Elizabeth & Travlos, Nickolaos G, 1990. " Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(2), pages 643-54, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Merton, Robert C., 1977. "An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees An application of modern option pricing theory," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 3-11, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Demsetz, Rebecca S & Strahan, Philip E, 1997. "Diversification, Size, and Risk at Bank Holding Companies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 300-313, August.
  21. Schranz, Mary S, 1993. "Takeovers Improve Firm Performance: Evidence from the Banking Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(2), pages 299-326, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Kane, Edward J., 1986. "Appearance and reality in deposit insurance: The case for reform," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 175-188, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Berger, Allen N, 1995. "The Relationship between Capital and Earnings in Banking," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(2), pages 432-56, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  24. Allen N. Berger & Anil K. Kashyap & Joseph Scalise, 1995. "The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip It's Been," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-06, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    Other versions:
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  1. Robert DeYoung & Kenneth Spong & Richard J. Sullivan, 1999. "Who's minding the store? motivating and monitoring hired managers at small, closely held firms: the case of commercial banks," Working Paper Series WP-99-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  2. David T. Llewellyn, 2002. "An analysis of the causes of recent banking crises," European Journal of Finance, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 8(2), pages 152-175, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Martin BROWNBRIDGE, 1998. "The Causes Of Financial Distress In Local Banks In Africa And Implications For Prudential Policy," UNCTAD Discussion Papers 132, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. [Downloadable!]
  4. Christine Marsal, 2006. "La cohérence dans la mobilisation du capital humain:une illustration de la théorie de l’architecture organisationnelle dans les banques de réseau," Working Papers FARGO 1060501, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
  5. D.T. Llewellyn, 2000. "Some Lessons for Bank Regulation from Recent Crises," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 51, Netherlands Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  6. Richard J. Sullivan & Kenneth R. Spong, 1998. "How does ownership structure and manager wealth influence risk? : a look at ownership structure, manager wealth, and risk in commercial banks," Financial Industry Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Dec, pages 15-40. [Downloadable!]
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