Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution. Shedding Light on Contentious Issues of Weighted Votes and the Constitutional Treaty

Contents:

Author Info

  • Paterson, Iain

    (Department of Economics and Finance, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Analysis of the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union shows that there is a serious discrepancy between the voting power gradient of Member States computed by the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. Given the lack of compelling arguments to choose between these indices on purely axiomatic grounds, we turn to a probabilistic approach as pioneered by Straffin (1977) focusing on the probability distribution of voting poll outcomes. We present a unifying model of power indices as expected decisiveness, which shows that the defining feature of each approach is a particular distribution of the voting poll. Empirical evidence drawn from voting situations, in addition to a consideration of first principles, leads us to reject one of these approaches. The unified formulation allows us to develop useful related concepts of efficiency and blocking leverage, previously used solely by a 'Banzhaf' approach, for the case of Shapley-Shubik, and a comparison of results is shown.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/es-187.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2006
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Studies in its series Economics Series with number 187.

    as in new window
    Length: 25 pages
    Date of creation: Mar 2006
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:187

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna, Austria
    Phone: ++43 - (0)1 - 599 91 - 0
    Fax: ++43 - (0)1 - 599 91 - 555
    Web page: http://www.ihs.ac.at
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Postal: Institute for Advanced Studies - Library, Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna, Austria

    Related research

    Keywords: Voting power indices; Power gradient; Coefficient of representation; Expected decisiveness; Efficiency; Blocking leverage; Constitution of the European Union;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Dan Felsenthal & Moshé Machover & William Zwicker, 1998. "The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of a Priori Voting Power," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 83-116, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:187. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Doris Szoncsitz).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.