Analysis of Information Feedback and Selfconfirming Equilibrium
AbstractOur recent research emphasizes the importance of information feedback in situations of recurrent decisions and strategic interaction, showing how it affects the uncertainty that underlies selfconfi?rming equilibrium. Here we discuss in detail the properties of such a key feature of recurrent interaction. This allows us to elucidate our notion of Maxmin selfconfi?rming equilibrium and compare it with an equilibrium concept due to Lehrer. Keywords: Selfconfi?rming equilibrium, conjectural equilibrium, information feed- back, partially speci?ed probabilities. JEL classification: C72, D80.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University in its series Working Papers with number 459.
Date of creation: 2012
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-12-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-12-15 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2012-12-15 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ehud Lehrer, 2012. "Partially Specified Probabilities: Decisions and Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 70-100, February.
- P Battigalli & S Cerreia-Vioglio & F Maccheroni & M Marinacci, 2012. "Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000376, David K. Levine.
- Yaron Azrieli, 2009. "On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 209-219, June.
- Lehrer, Ehud & Teper, Roee, 2011. "Justifiable preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 762-774, March.
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