A limit theorem for equilibria under ambiguous belief correspondences
AbstractPrevious literature shows that, in many different models, limits of equilibria of perturbed games are equilibria of the unperturbed game when the sequence of perturbed games converges to the unperturbed one in an appropriate sense. The question of whether such a limit property extends to the equilibrium notions in ambiguous games is not yet as clear as it seems; in fact, previous literature shows that the extension fails in simple examples.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 66 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Other versions of this item:
- Giuseppe De Marco & Maria Romaniello, 2011. "A Limit Theorem for Equilibria under Ambiguous Beliefs Correspondences," CSEF Working Papers 299, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
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