Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Adaptive Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games

Contents:

Author Info

  • Mario Gilli

    (Istituto di Economia Politica, Università Bocconi)

Abstract

This paper deals with the problem of specifying a general learning model, the rationality of which is not situation dependent. I propose a very general model of adaptive learning suitable to study learning problems in games with imperfect monitoring, such as extensive form games. In this context I relate adaptive learning with a general notion of equilibrium; in particular I provide a dynamic characterization of Conjectural equilibria: a "stable" strategy profile is consistent with adaptive learning if and only if it is a Conjectural equilibrium. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/redy.1998.0047
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: Access to full texts is restricted to ScienceDirect subscribers and ScienceDirect institutional members. See http://www.sciencedirect.com/ for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.

Volume (Year): 2 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 472-485

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:2:y:1999:i:2:p:472-485

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Review of Economic Dynamics Academic Press Editorial Office 525 "B" Street, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101
Fax: 1-314-444-8731
Email:
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/review.htm
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/RED17.htm

Related research

Keywords: adaptive learning; justification operator; imperfect monitoring games;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Lehrer, Ehud, 1992. "On the Equilibrium Payoffs Set of Two Player Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 211-26.
  2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2147, David K. Levine.
  3. Ebbe Hendon & Hans Jorgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth, 1995. "Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 95-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Rational Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Working Papers 46, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:2:y:1999:i:2:p:472-485. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.