The Political Economy of Fiscal Reform in Latin America: The Case of Argentina
AbstractThis paper investigates the political economy of fiscal reform activism in Argentina since the late 1980s. Between 1988 and 2008, tax legislation was changed 83 times, fiscal federal rules 14 times, and budgetary institutions sixteen times. Tax and budgetary reforms moved from centralizing revenue sources and spending authority in the federal government to mild decentralization lately. Fiscal federal rules combined centralization of revenues and management in the federal government with short-term compensations for the provinces. This paper contends that reform activism can be explained by the recurrence of economic and policy shocks while reform patterns may be accounted for as consequences of the decreasing political integration of national parties in a polity whose decisionmaking rules encourage the formation of oversized coalitions. The decrease in political integration weakened the national party leaderships’ ability to coordinate intergovernmental bargaining, and strengthened the local bosses and factions needed to form oversized coalitions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4666.
Date of creation: May 2010
Date of revision:
Public finance; Budget; Taxes; Federalism; Intergovernmental relations;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2010-05-22 (Development)
- NEP-HIS-2010-05-22 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-PBE-2010-05-22 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2010-05-22 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mariano Tommasi & Sebastian Saiegh & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2001.
"Fiscal Federalism in Argentina: Policies, Politics, and Institutional Reform,"
Journal of LACEA Economia,
LACEA - LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION.
- Mariano Tommasi & Sebastian M. Saiegh & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2001. "Fiscal Federalism in Argentina: Policies, Politics, and Institutional Reform," Working Papers 32, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised May 2001.
- Mariano Tommasi, 2005.
"The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy,"
90, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Dec 2005.
- Pablo T. Spiller, 2003.
"The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 281-306, October.
- Mariano Tommasi & Pablo T. Spiller, 2000. "The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina," Working Papers 29, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised May 2000.
- Juan Pablo Nicolini & Josefina Posadas & Juan Sanguinetti & Pablo Sanguinetti & Mariano Tommasi, 2002. "Decentralization, Fiscal Discipline in Sub-National Governments and the Bailout Problem: The Case of Argentina," Research Department Publications 3160, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Mariano Tommasi, 2002. "Federalism in Argentina and the Reforms of the 1990s," Working Papers 48, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised May 2002.
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