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Instituciones políticas, procesos de diseño de políticas y resultados de las políticas en México

Author

Listed:
  • Fabrice Lehoucq
  • Gabriel Negretto
  • Francisco Aparicio
  • Benito Nacif
  • Allyson Benton

Abstract

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo se emplea un marco de costos de transacción para vincular el proceso de diseño de políticas (PMP, por sus siglas en inglés) y las características externas de las políticas públicas en México, un país en desarrollo con ingresos medios. Se muestra cómo un PMP altamente secreto y centralizado alrededor de la Presidencia produjo políticas de corte nacionalista que fueron estables, adaptables, coordinadas y consideradas para con el sector privado radicado en las ciudades y que constituye el soporte corporativista del régimen. Sin embargo, cuando el crecimiento flaqueó a finales de los años 70, este PMP no pudo adaptarse a la inestabilidad económica, aunque mantuvo su vigor en un cuerpo político cada vez más inquieto. El documento explica cómo un gobierno unificado y el control corporativista de la economía convirtieron a un presidente constitucionalmente débil en la envidia de ejecutivos de todo el mundo, incluso a costa de no poder promulgar reformas que resultaren costosas a corto plazo para los pilares corporativistas del régimen. El artículo también explica por qué la democratización durante los años 90 está dando pie a un PMP menos centralizado y más abierto, que beneficie a un sector más amplio de la población. A medida que se materializa la separación de poderes consagrada en la Constitución de 1917, el diseño de políticas se va entretejiendo cada vez más con el status quo. Por otro lado, un gobierno dividido conserva un marco macroeconómico que se corresponde con una economía abierta (como por ejemplo, políticas fiscalmente prudentes y un tipo de cambio flotante). Por otro lado, los frenos y contrapesos están ayudando a partidos nuevos y viejos y a grupos de intereses a obstaculizar la confluencia de voluntades en cuanto al aumento de impuestos crónicamente bajos (10% del PIB) y sobre la reforma de políticas nacionalistas que restrinjan la inversión del sector privado en el sector energético controlado por el Estado.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrice Lehoucq & Gabriel Negretto & Francisco Aparicio & Benito Nacif & Allyson Benton, 2005. "Instituciones políticas, procesos de diseño de políticas y resultados de las políticas en México," Research Department Publications 3205, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:3205
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    References listed on IDEAS

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