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Firm-Level Determinants of Board System Choice: Evidence from Russia

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  • Iwasaki, Ichiro
  • 岩﨑, 一郎

Abstract

In this paper, using a unique dataset of joint-stock companies, we empirically examine the determinants of the choice and size of the collective executive board, a core element of the multi-tier board system of Russian firms. Our empirical evidence strongly suggests that the need of company executives for a collective management system is a key driver for the formation of a collective executive board, while outside investors are generally indifferent toward its adoption as a means to strengthening the monitoring and control functions over top management. We also found that Russian firms in the pursuit of the internationalization of their business activities tend to avoid the establishment of a collective executive board, which is a diverse corporate organ from the viewpoint of the international standard of corporate governance systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Iwasaki, Ichiro & 岩﨑, 一郎, 2013. "Firm-Level Determinants of Board System Choice: Evidence from Russia," RRC Working Paper Series 32_v2, Russian Research Center, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:rrcwps:32_v2
    Note: This version: Feb, 2013
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    Cited by:

    1. Ichiro Iwasaki, 2018. "Corporate Governance System and Regional Heterogeneity: Evidence from East and West Russia," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(3), pages 391-420, September.
    2. Muravyev, Alexander, 2017. "Boards of directors in Russian publicly traded companies in 1998–2014: Structure, dynamics and performance effects," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 5-25.
    3. Iwasaki, Ichiro, 2014. "Global financial crisis, corporate governance, and firm survival:," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 178-211.
    4. Iwasaki, Ichiro, 2018. "International Presence of the Japanese Study of Russian and East European Economies," RRC Working Paper Series 74, Russian Research Center, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    5. Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini & Emiliano Sironi, 2017. "Does a one-tier board affect firms’ performances? Evidences from Italian unlisted enterprises," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 213-224, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    board system choice; executive board; corporate governance; strategic management; Russia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
    • P34 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Finance

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