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Government directors and business–state relations in Russia

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  • Frye, Timothy M.
  • Iwasaki, Ichiro

Abstract

We propose three ideal types of business–state relations in a transition economy and explore the impact of government directors on corporate boards for firm behavior. Using a unique dataset of joint-stock companies in Russia, we find that the presence of government directors on corporate boards is more consistent with a “collusion” ideal type of relations between firms and the state than with a managerial discipline or rent-extraction ideal type. The state sends directors to firms that both extract resources from the state, but that also provide important benefits and services to the state.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 27 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 642-658

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:4:p:642-658

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

Related research

Keywords: Politically connected firm; Government directorship; Business–state relationship; Corporate governance quality; Russia;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Iwasaki, Ichiro, 2014. "Global financial crisis, corporate governance, and firm survival:," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 178-211.
  2. Ebrahim, M. Shahid & Girma, Sourafel & Shah, M. Eskandar & Williams, Jonathan, 2014. "Dynamic capital structure and political patronage: The case of Malaysia," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 117-128.
  3. Ichiro Iwasaki, 2013. "Firm-Level Determinants of Board System Choice: Evidence from Russia," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 55(4), pages 636-671, December.
  4. Ichiro Iwasaki & John van Reenen & Toby Wolfe, 2011. "Economic transition, firm organisation and internal control: determinants of audit structure in Russian firms," Working Papers 126, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Office of the Chief Economist.

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