IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/eufman/v12y2006i2p221-248.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Corporate Performance, Corporate Governance and Top Executive Turnover in Finland

Author

Listed:
  • Benjamin Maury

Abstract

This paper empirically investigates how corporate governance forces and firm performance affect top executive turnover in Finnish listed companies. I document an increase in CEO, top management, and board turnover in response to poor stock price performance and operating losses. The sensitivity of the relation between stock price performance and CEO turnover is significantly higher in firms with a two‐tier board structure (when the CEO is not the chairman), but significantly lower when the CEO or a board member is the controlling shareholder. These results suggest that both the ownership structure and the board design have implications for the disciplining of managers.

Suggested Citation

  • Benjamin Maury, 2006. "Corporate Performance, Corporate Governance and Top Executive Turnover in Finland," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 12(2), pages 221-248, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:eufman:v:12:y:2006:i:2:p:221-248
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1354-7798.2006.00317.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-7798.2006.00317.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1354-7798.2006.00317.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Armando Gomes, "undated". "Multiple Large Shareholders in Corporate Governance," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 05-99, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Julio Pindado & Chabela De La Torre, 2006. "The Role of Investment, Financing and Dividend Decisions in Explaining Corporate Ownership Structure: Empirical Evidence from Spain," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 12(5), pages 661-687, November.
    2. González, Maximiliano & Guzmán, Alexander & Pablo, Eduardo & Trujillo, María-Andrea, 2019. "Is board turnover driven by performance in family firms?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 169-186.
    3. Stephen G. Sapp, 2008. "The Impact of Corporate Governance on Executive Compensation," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 14(4), pages 710-746, September.
    4. Wenfeng Wu & Chongfeng Wu & Oliver M. Rui, 2012. "Ownership and the Value of Political Connections: Evidence from China," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 18(4), pages 695-729, September.
    5. Buyl, Tine & Boone, Christophe & Wade, James B., 2015. "Non-CEO executive mobility: The impact of poor firm performance and TMT attention," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 257-267.
    6. Tran, Quoc Trung & Nguyen, Xuan Minh & Nguyen, Tien Hoang, 2016. "CEO duality, state shareholder and CEO turnover: Evidence from Vietnamese stock market," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center (PRADEC), vol. 12(3).
    7. Sabri Boubaker & Pascal Nguyen & Wael Rouatbi, 2016. "Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate Risk†taking: Evidence from French Family Firms," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 22(4), pages 697-745, September.
    8. Ichiro Iwasaki, 2013. "Firm-Level Determinants of Board System Choice: Evidence from Russia," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 55(4), pages 636-671, December.
    9. Weiwen Li & Yuan Lu, 2012. "CEO dismissal, institutional development, and environmental dynamism," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 1007-1026, December.
    10. Bhattacharya, Prasad S. & Graham, Michael A., 2009. "On institutional ownership and firm performance: A disaggregated view," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 370-394, December.
    11. Ali Ataullah & Ian Davidson & Hang Le, 2010. "Large Shareholders, the Board of Directors and the Allocation of Cash Proceeds from Corporate Asset Sell†offs," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 16(2), pages 271-295, March.
    12. Iwasaki, Ichiro, 2011. "Executive Board: The Russian Experience," RRC Working Paper Series 32, Russian Research Center, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    13. Stephen A. Ojeka & Dorcas T. Adetula & Dick O. Mukoro & Oyintinane P. Kpokpo, 2017. "Does Chief Executive Officer Succession Affect Firms Financial Performance in Nigeria?," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(2), pages 530-535.
    14. Bum-Jin Park & Ki-Hoon Lee, 2021. "The sensitivity of corporate social performance to corporate financial performance: A “time-based†agency theory perspective," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 46(2), pages 224-247, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yeddou, Nacera & Pourroy, Marc, 2020. "Bank liquidity creation: Does ownership structure matter?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 116-131.
    2. Becht, Marco & Bolton, Patrick & Roell, Ailsa, 2003. "Corporate governance and control," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-109, Elsevier.
    3. Boubakri, Narjess & Cosset, Jean-Claude & Samet, Anis, 2010. "The choice of ADRs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(9), pages 2077-2095, September.
    4. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
    5. Carvalhal, Andre, 2012. "Do shareholder agreements affect market valuation?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 919-933.
    6. Chaiyasit Anuchitworawong, 2010. "The Value of Principles-Based Governance Practices and the Attenuation of Information Asymmetry," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer;Japanese Association of Financial Economics and Engineering, vol. 17(2), pages 171-207, June.
    7. Armando Gomes, "undated". "Going Public with Asymmetric Information, Agency Costs, and Dynamic Trading," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 04-99, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    8. Lihui Tian & Saul Estrin, 2005. "Retained State Shareholding in Chinese PLCs: Does Government Ownership Reduce Corporate Value?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp750, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    9. Shehzad, Choudhry Tanveer & de Haan, Jakob & Scholtens, Bert, 2010. "The impact of bank ownership concentration on impaired loans and capital adequacy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 399-408, February.
    10. Yoser Gadhoum, 2006. "Power of Ultimate Controlling Owners: A Survey of Canadian Landscape," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 10(2), pages 179-204, May.
    11. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H.P. & Leung, Joanne, 2000. "Dividends and Exploration," Working Paper Series 3917, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    12. Bennedsen, Morten & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2000. "The balance of power in closely held corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 113-139.
    13. Larry H. P. Lang & Mara Faccio & Leslie Young, 2001. "Dividends and Expropriation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 54-78, March.
    14. Cheng, Minying & Lin, Bingxuan & Wei, Minghai, 2013. "How does the relationship between multiple large shareholders affect corporate valuations? Evidence from China," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 43-70.
    15. repec:vuw:vuwscr:19016 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H.P. & Leung, Joanne, 2000. "Dividends and Exploration," Working Paper Series 19016, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    17. Yoser Gadhoum & Larry H. P. Lang & Leslie Young, 2005. "Who Controls US?," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 11(3), pages 339-363, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:eufman:v:12:y:2006:i:2:p:221-248. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/efmaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.