Who Controls US?
Abstract"Berle and Means asserted that US corporations typically have dispersed shareholders; their evidence did not support this conclusion. Today, 59.74% of US corporations have 'controlling shareholders' who hold at least 10% of the shares; 24.57% are controlled and managed by a family; 16.33% are controlled by a widely-held financial institution; 13.55% are controlled through family trusts. In all size ranges, the USA has more corporations controlled by families than by financial institutions. In almost all size ranges, it has a higher percentage of family-controlled corporations than any of next four largest economies". Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2005.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Financial Management Association in its journal European Financial Management.
Volume (Year): 11 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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