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Who Controls US?

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  • Yoser Gadhoum
  • Larry H. P. Lang
  • Leslie Young
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    Abstract

    "Berle and Means asserted that US corporations typically have dispersed shareholders; their evidence did not support this conclusion. Today, 59.74% of US corporations have 'controlling shareholders' who hold at least 10% of the shares; 24.57% are controlled and managed by a family; 16.33% are controlled by a widely-held financial institution; 13.55% are controlled through family trusts. In all size ranges, the USA has more corporations controlled by families than by financial institutions. In almost all size ranges, it has a higher percentage of family-controlled corporations than any of next four largest economies". Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2005.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by European Financial Management Association in its journal European Financial Management.

    Volume (Year): 11 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 339-363

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:eufman:v:11:y:2005:i:3:p:339-363

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    Cited by:
    1. claudio Michelacci & Fabiano Schivardi, 2008. "Does Idiosyncratic Business Risk Matter?," EIEF Working Papers Series 0813, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Jul 2008.
    2. Poulsen, Thomas, 2011. "Private benefits in corporate control transactions," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 52-58, January.
    3. Michael R. King & Eric Santor, 2007. "Family Values: Ownership Structure, Performance and Capital Structure of Canadian Firms," Working Papers 07-40, Bank of Canada.
    4. Thomas Poulsen, 2013. "Corporate control and underinvestment," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 131-155, February.
    5. Victor Dorofeenko & Larry Lang & Klaus Ritzberger & Jamsheed Shorish, 2008. "Who controls Allianz?," Annals of Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 75-103, January.
    6. Kryzanowski, Lawrence & Zhang, Ying, 2013. "Financial restatements and Sarbanes–Oxley: Impact on Canadian firm governance and management turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 87-105.
    7. Erik Dietzenbacher & Umed Temurshoev, 2008. "Ownership relations in the presence of cross-shareholding," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 95(3), pages 189-212, December.
    8. Liu, Chunyan & Uchida, Konari & Yang, Yufeng, 2014. "Controlling shareholder, split-share structure reform and cash dividend payments in China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 339-357.

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