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Multiple Large Shareholders in Corporate Governance Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Armando Gomes
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Paper provided by Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research in its series Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers with number
05-99.
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Handle: RePEc:fth:pennfi:05-99Contact details of provider: Postal: 3254 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6367 Phone: (215) 898-7616 Fax: (215) 573-8084 Email: Web page: http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~rlwctr/ More information through EDIRC
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Patrick BOLTON & Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1996.
"Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control ,"
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)
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Other versions: Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model ,"
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Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990.
"Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
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Other versions: Marco Pagano & Ailsa Röell, 1998.
"The Choice Of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, And The Decision To Go Public ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 187-225, February.
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Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986.
"The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
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Other versions: Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 1998.
"Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 172-204, February.
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Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 1998.
"Corporate Ownership Around the World ,"
NBER Working Papers
6625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Other versions: Ausubel, Lawrence M & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1993.
"Efficient Sequential Bargaining ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(2), pages 435-61, April.
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Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983.
"Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
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Other versions: Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1990.
"Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 351-67, July.
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Winton, Andrew, 1993.
" Limitation of Liability and the Ownership Structure of the Firm ,"
Journal of Finance ,
American Finance Association, vol. 48(2), pages 487-512, June.
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Burkart, Mike & Gromb, Denis & Panunzi, Fausto, 1997.
"Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 693-728, August.
Darrough, Masako N & Stoughton, Neal M, 1989.
"A Bargaining Approach to Profit Sharing in Joint Ventures ,"
Journal of Business ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 237-70, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1988.
"Corporate control contests and capital structure ,"
Journal of Financial Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 55-86, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Yoser Gadhoum, 2006.
"Power of Ultimate Controlling Owners: A Survey of Canadian Landscape ,"
Journal of Management and Governance ,
Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 179-204, 05.
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Tian, Lihui & Estrin, Saul, 2005.
"Retained State Shareholding in Chinese PLCs: Does Government Ownership Reduce Corporate Value? ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1493, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Mara Faccio & Larry H. P. Lang & Leslie Young, 2001.
"Dividends and Expropriation ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 54-78, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Armando Gomes, .
"Going Public with Asymmetric Information, Agency Costs, and Dynamic Trading ,"
Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers
4-99, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
[Downloadable!]
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