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Ownership Strucure ad the Performance of Belgian Listed Firms

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  • Malika HAMADI

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))

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    Abstract

    In this study we investigate empirically the relationship between ownership structure of Belgian listed firms, and their performance measured by Tobin’s Q. We focus on the management and the largest shareholders equity ownership. We use first a cross-sectional estimation from 1991 to 1996. Second, we use panel data estimation to control whether the results found cross-sectionally are not due to unobserved firm heteroeneity. The use of panel data confirms the results obtained cross-sectionally for managerial ownership, that is, the relationship between the fraction of equities held by managers and Tobin’s Q is negative. However, panel data results for the relationship between largest sharholders equities ownership and Tobin’s Q become positive, while it is negative cross-sectionally. These results indicate that there is firm heterogeneity which is not captured in the cross-section estimation.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) with number 2002015.

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    Length: 35
    Date of creation: 01 May 2002
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    Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2002015

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    Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/ires
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    Related research

    Keywords: Corporate governance; managerial ownership; largest shareholders ownership; firm performance; Tobin’sQ; cross-sectional models; panel data;

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