Firm-Level Determinants of Board System Choice: Evidence from Russia
AbstractIn this paper, using a unique dataset of joint-stock companies, we empirically examine the determinants of the choice and size of the collective executive board, a core element of the multi-tier board system of Russian firms. Our empirical evidence strongly suggests that the need of company executives for a collective management system is a key driver for the formation of a collective executive board, while outside investors are generally indifferent toward its adoption as a means to strengthening the monitoring and control functions over top management. We also found that Russian firms in the pursuit of the internationalization of their business activities tend to avoid the establishment of a collective executive board, which is a diverse corporate organ from the viewpoint of the international standard of corporate governance systems.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Russian Research Center, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series RRC Working Paper Series with number 32.
Length: 28,  p.
Date of creation: Feb 2013
Date of revision:
Note: This version: Feb, 2013
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi City, Tokyo 186-8603
Web page: http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/rrc/
More information through EDIRC
board system choice; executive board; corporate governance; strategic management; Russia;
Other versions of this item:
- Ichiro Iwasaki, 2013. "Firm-Level Determinants of Board System Choice: Evidence from Russia," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 55(4), pages 636-671, December.
- D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
- P34 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Finance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-06-11 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CIS-2011-06-11 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-TRA-2011-06-11 (Transition Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Naohito Abe & Ichiro Iwasaki, 2010.
"Organisational culture and corporate governance in Russia: a study of managerial turnover,"
Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(4), pages 449-470.
- Abe, Naohito & Iwasaki, Ichiro, 2010. "Organizational Culture and Corporate Governance in Russia : A Study of Managerial Turnover," RRC Working Paper Series 21, Russian Research Center, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Iwasaki, Ichiro, 2008.
"The determinants of board composition in a transforming economy: Evidence from Russia,"
Journal of Corporate Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 532-549, December.
- Iwasaki, Ichiro, 2008. "The Determinants of Board Composition in a Transforming Economy: Evidence from Russia," RRC Working Paper Series 9, Russian Research Center, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Ichiro Iwasaki, 2007. "Enterprise Reform And Corporate Governance In Russia: A Quantitative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(5), pages 849-902, December.
- Tor Eriksson & Erik StrÃ¸jer Madsen & Mogens Dilling-Hansen & Valdemar Smith, 2001. "Determinants of CEO and Board Turnover," Empirica, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 243-257, September.
- Frye, Timothy M. & Iwasaki, Ichiro, 2011. "Government directors and business–state relations in Russia," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 642-658.
- I. Iwasaki, 2007. "Legal Forms of Joint-Stock Companies and Corporate Behavior in Russia," Problems of Economic Transition, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 50(5), pages 73-86, September.
- Hans van Ees & Theo J.B.M. Postma & Elmer Sterken, 2003. "Board Characteristics and Corporate Performance in the Netherlands," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 29(1), pages 41-58, Winter.
- Iwasaki, Ichiro, 2013. "Global Financial Crisis, Corporate Governance, and Firm Survival: The Russian Experience," RRC Working Paper Series 37, Russian Research Center, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Iwasaki, Ichiro, 2014. "Global financial crisis, corporate governance, and firm survival:," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 178-211.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.