Firm-Level Determinants of Board System Choice: Evidence from Russia
In this paper, using a unique data set of joint-stock companies, we empirically examine the determinants of the choice and size of the collective executive board, a core element of the multi-tier board system of Russian firms. Our empirical evidence strongly suggests that the need of company executives for a collective management system is a key driver for the formation of a collective executive board, while outside investors are generally indifferent toward its adoption as a means to strengthening the monitoring and control functions over top management. We also found that Russian firms in the pursuit of the internationalization of their business activities tend to avoid the establishment of a collective executive board, which is an unorthodox corporate organ from the viewpoint of the international standard of corporate governance systems.
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Volume (Year): 55 (2013)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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