IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/lunewp/2020_021.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Macroeconomic Equilibriums, Crises and Fiscal Policy

Author

Listed:

Abstract

Macroeconomic crises are common as well as economically, socially and politically costly. Fiscal policy plays an important role in alleviating the costs of the crisis. However, recent experiences suggest that the public finances often are unprepared for a crisis. Deficits and debt levels prior to the crisis are commonly too high, limiting the government’s ability to respond to the crisis. In this paper, we argue that theoretical macroeconomic models focus on stable equilibriums, may partially explain why governments underestimate the risk of economic crises and carry too much debt prior to such events. In the standard equilibrium models, crises are one-off events caused by external factors. These macro-models thus neither predict nor expect a future crisis, which creates a false impression of long-run economic stability. Using forecast data, we demonstrate how the equilibrium perspective dominates macroeconomic thinking and how it contributes to too-high debt ratios prior to a crisis. We end the paper by discussing how to design fiscal policy rules based on a crisis rather than an equilibrium approach.

Suggested Citation

  • Andersson, Fredrik N. G., 2020. "Macroeconomic Equilibriums, Crises and Fiscal Policy," Working Papers 2020:21, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2020_021
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/wp20_21.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sanjay Reddy & Camelia Minoiu, 2009. "Real Income Stagnation of Countries 1960-2001," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(1), pages 1-23.
    2. Graciela Kaminsky & Saul Lizondo & Carmen M. Reinhart, 1998. "Leading Indicators of Currency Crises," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(1), pages 1-48, March.
    3. Olivier Blanchard, 2019. "Public Debt and Low Interest Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1197-1229, April.
    4. Mark Hallerberg & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 209-232, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Jesper Lindé, 2018. "DSGE models: still useful in policy analysis?," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 34(1-2), pages 269-286.
    6. Pierluigi Balduzzi & Emanuele Brancati & Marco Brianti & Fabio Schiantarelli, 2019. "Populism, Political Risk and the Economy: Lessons from Italy," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 989, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 28 Apr 2020.
    7. D. Colander & H. Follmer & A. Haas & M. Goldberg & K. Juselius & A. Kirman & T. Lux & B. Sloth, 2010. "The Financial Crisis and the Systemic Failure of Academic Economics," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 6.
    8. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2014. "This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(2), pages 215-268, November.
    9. Funke, Manuel & Schularick, Moritz & Trebesch, Christoph, 2016. "Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870–2014," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 227-260.
    10. Andersson, Fredrik NG, 2016. "A Blessing in Disguise? Banking Crises and Institutional Change," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 135-147.
    11. Lars Jonung & Martin Larch, 2006. "Improving fiscal policy in the EU: the case for independent forecasts [‘Fiscal forecasting: The track record of the IMF, OECD and EC’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 21(47), pages 492-534.
    12. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2010. "Growth in a Time of Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 573-578, May.
    13. Richard McManus & F. Gulcin Ozkan, 2015. "On the Consequences of Pro‐Cyclical Fiscal Policy," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 36, pages 29-50, March.
    14. Breuer, Janice Boucher & McDermott, John, 2013. "Economic depression in the world," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 38(PB), pages 227-242.
    15. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "Varieties of Crises and Their Dates," Introductory Chapters, in: This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press.
    16. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 403-414.
    17. Inklaar, Robert & de Jong, Harmen & Bolt, Jutta & van Zanden, Jan, 2018. "Rebasing 'Maddison': new income comparisons and the shape of long-run economic development," GGDC Research Memorandum GD-174, Groningen Growth and Development Centre, University of Groningen.
    18. Alessi, Lucia & Detken, Carsten, 2011. "Quasi real time early warning indicators for costly asset price boom/bust cycles: A role for global liquidity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 520-533, September.
    19. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2011. "From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1676-1706, August.
    20. Olivier Blanchard, 2016. "Do DSGE Models Have a Future?," Policy Briefs PB16-11, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    21. Andersson, Fredrik N.G. & Jonung, Lars, 2020. "Lessons from the Swedish Experience with Negative Central Bank Rates," Working Papers 2020:15, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    22. Falilou Fall & Debra Bloch & Jean-Marc Fournier & Peter Hoeller, 2015. "Prudent debt targets and fiscal frameworks," OECD Economic Policy Papers 15, OECD Publishing.
    23. Poterba, James M. & von Hagen, Jurgen (ed.), 1999. "Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226676234, December.
    24. James M. Poterba & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number pote99-1, March.
    25. Marco Gallegati & Willi Semmler (ed.), 2014. "Wavelet Applications in Economics and Finance," Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance, Springer, edition 127, number 978-3-319-07061-2, July-Dece.
    26. Olivier J Blanchard, 2019. "Public Debt: Fiscal and Welfare Costs in a Time of Low Interest Rates," Policy Briefs PB19-2, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    27. C Alexiou & J G Nellis, 2016. "A post-mortem of austerity: the Greek experience," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 21(2), pages 1-32, September.
    28. Claudio Borio & Mathias Drehmann, 2009. "Assessing the risk of banking crises - revisited," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, March.
    29. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2011. "Rethinking Macroeconomics: What Failed, And How To Repair It," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 591-645, August.
    30. Olivier Blanchard, 2018. "On the future of macroeconomic models," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 34(1-2), pages 43-54.
    31. Velasco, Andres, 2000. "Debts and deficits with fragmented fiscal policymaking," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 105-125, April.
    32. Mr. Philip Barrett, 2018. "Interest-Growth Differentials and Debt Limits in Advanced Economies," IMF Working Papers 2018/082, International Monetary Fund.
    33. Krogstrup, Signe & Wyplosz, Charles, 2010. "A common pool theory of supranational deficit ceilings," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 269-278, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Knuepfer, K. & Rogalski, N. & Knuepfer, A. & Esteban, M. & Shibayama, T., 2022. "A reliable energy system for Japan with merit order dispatch, high variable renewable share and no nuclear power," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 328(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Panizza, Ugo & Fatás, Antonio & Ghosh, Atish R. & ,, 2019. "The Motives to Borrow," CEPR Discussion Papers 13735, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Alesina, A. & Passalacqua, A., 2016. "The Political Economy of Government Debt," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 2599-2651, Elsevier.
    3. Falilou Fall & Debra Bloch & Jean-Marc Fournier & Peter Hoeller, 2015. "Prudent debt targets and fiscal frameworks," OECD Economic Policy Papers 15, OECD Publishing.
    4. Robert Hagemann, 2011. "How Can Fiscal Councils Strengthen Fiscal Performance?," OECD Journal: Economic Studies, OECD Publishing, vol. 2011(1), pages 1-24.
    5. Robert P. Hagemann, 2010. "Improving Fiscal Performance Through Fiscal Councils," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 829, OECD Publishing.
    6. Moreno Badia, Marialuz & Medas, Paulo & Gupta, Pranav & Xiang, Yuan, 2022. "Debt is not free," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    7. Bergman, U. Michael & Hutchison, Michael M. & Jensen, Svend E. Hougaard, 2016. "Promoting sustainable public finances in the European Union: The role of fiscal rules and government efficiency," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 1-19.
    8. Bicaba, Zorobabel & Kapp, Daniel & Molteni, Francesco, 2014. "Stability periods between financial crises: The role of macroeconomic fundamentals and crises management policies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 346-360.
    9. Lainà, Patrizio & Nyholm, Juho & Sarlin, Peter, 2015. "Leading indicators of systemic banking crises: Finland in a panel of EU countries," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 18-35.
    10. Patrizio Lainà & Juho Nyholm & Peter Sarlin, 2015. "Leading indicators of systemic banking crises: Finland in a panel of EU countries," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 24(1), pages 18-35, January.
    11. Kauko, Karlo, 2014. "How to foresee banking crises? A survey of the empirical literature," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 289-308.
    12. Manuel Funke & Moritz Schularick & Christoph Trebesch, 2023. "Populist Leaders and the Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(12), pages 3249-3288, December.
    13. Stijn Claessens & M. Ayhan Kose, 2013. "Financial Crises: Explanations, Types and Implications," CAMA Working Papers 2013-06, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    14. Lainà, Patrizio & Nyholm, Juho & Sarlin, Peter, 2015. "Leading indicators of systemic banking crises: Finland in a panel of EU countries," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 18-35.
    15. Krogstrup, Signe & Wyplosz, Charles, 2010. "A common pool theory of supranational deficit ceilings," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 269-278, February.
    16. Lars P. Feld, 2010. "Sinnhaftigkeit und Effektivität der deutschen Schuldenbremse," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(3), pages 226-245, August.
    17. Boysen-Hogrefe, Jens & Gern, Klaus-Jürgen & Groll, Dominik & Jannsen, Nils & Kooths, Stefan & Plödt, Martin & van Roye, Björn & Scheide, Joachim & Schwarzmüller, Tim, 2015. "Das europäische Verfahren zur Vermeidung und Korrektur makroökonomischer Ungleichgewichte: Auswertung der bisherigen Erfahrung und mögliche Reformansätze," Kieler Beiträge zur Wirtschaftspolitik 7, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    18. Roel M.W.J.Beetsma & Frederick van der Ploeg, 2007. "The political economy of public investment," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 276, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    19. Roel M.W.J. Beetsma & Frederick van der Ploeg, 2007. "Partisan Public Investment and Debt: The Case for Fiscal Restrictions," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/37, European University Institute.
    20. Kose, M. Ayhan & Kurlat, Sergio & Ohnsorge, Franziska & Sugawara, Naotaka, 2022. "A cross-country database of fiscal space," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    crisis; equilibrium; macroeconomic models; fiscal policy; national debt; fiscal frameworks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E17 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • E37 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2020_021. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Prakriti Thami (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/delunse.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.