The Multi-item Bisection Auction
AbstractThis paper proposes an iterative sealed-bid auction for selling multiple heterogeneous items with unit-demand agents. It generalizes the single item bisection auction (Grigorieva Et. al, 2007) to the environment with multiple heterogeneous items. We show that it elicits a minimal amount of information on preferences required to find the Vickrey-Clark-Groves outcome (Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973, Vickrey, 1961), when there are two items for sale and an arbitrary number of agents.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2011:31.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 07 Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published as Erlanson, Albin, 'The Dou-Item Bisection Auction' in Computational Economics, 2014, pages 15-31.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/en
More information through EDIRC
Bisection Auction; Multi-item; Unit-demand; Sealed-bid;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-10-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2011-10-15 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2011-10-15 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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University of Chicago - Economics Research Center
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- Debasis Mishra & David C. Parkes, 2007.
"Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions,"
Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers
07-04, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
- Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-72, August.
- Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February.
- Tommy Andersson & Christer Andersson, 2012. "Properties of the DGS-Auction Algorithm," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 39(2), pages 113-133, February.
- Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
- Elena Grigorieva & P. Herings & Rudolf Müller & Dries Vermeulen, 2007.
"The private value single item bisection auction,"
Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 107-118, January.
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