Multi-Item Vickery-English-Dutch Auctions
AbstractAssuming that bidders wish to acquire at most one item, this paper defines a polynomial time multiitem auction that locates the VCG prices in a finite number of iterations for any given starting prices. This auction is called the Vickrey-English-Dutch auction and it contains the Vickrey-English auction (J.K. Sankaran, Math. Soc. Sci. 28:143–150, 1994) and the Vickrey-Dutch auction (D. Mishra and D. Parkes, Games Econ. Behav. 66:326–347, 2009) as special cases. Several properties of this iterative auction are provided. It is, for example, demonstrated that the number of iterations from the starting prices to the VCG prices can be calculated using a measure based on the Chebyshev metric. By means of numerical experiments, it is showed that when the auctioneer knows the bidders’ value distributions, the Vickrey-English-Dutch auction is weakly faster than the Vickrey- English auction and the Vickrey-Dutch auction in 89 percent and 99 percent, respectively, of the investigated problems. A greedy version of the Vickrey-English-Dutch auction is demonstrated to perform even better in the simulation studies. In fact, it follows the theoretically shortest path in 63 percent of the investigated problems.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2012:17.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 21 Jun 2012
Date of revision: 15 Jan 2013
Publication status: Published as Andersson, Tommy and Albin Erlanson, 'Multi-Item Vickery-English-Dutch Auctions' in Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, pages 116-129.
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Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/en
More information through EDIRC
Polynomial time algorithms; Multi-item auctions; Unit-demand bidders; Iterations;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2012-07-08 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-07-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-07-08 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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