What’s in a Name? - An ethnical discrimination experiment
AbstractThis paper presents the results from an ethnical discrimination experiment that was conducted in one of Sweden’s most “problematic” cities with respect to the integration process of refugees. The subjects confronted three different bargaining games; one trust game, one social exclusion and coalition formation game; and one battle of the sexes game. No general discrimination effect was detected. However, one specific effect was that Non-Swedes were less likely to be chosen as bargaining partners in the coalition formation game. Another specific effect was found in the males’ trust and ultimatum responses; Non-Swedes had higher returns on being generous compared to Swedes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2000:3.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 09 May 2000
Date of revision: 16 Apr 2001
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/en
More information through EDIRC
bargaining; ethnical discrimination; experiments;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
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