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Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment: Comment

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Author Info

  • Kocker, Martin G.

    (University of Munich and University of Innsbruck)

  • Lenz, Marc V.

    (University of Cologne)

  • Sutter, Matthias

    ()
    (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)

Abstract

Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (forthcoming) report for a sample of 129 shootouts from various seasons in ten different competitions that teams kicking first in soccer penalty shootouts win significantly more often than teams kicking second. Collecting data for the entire history of six major soccer competitions we cannot replicate their result. Teams kicking first win only 53.4% of 262 shootouts in our data, which is not significantly different from random. Our findings have two implications: (1) Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta’s results are not generally robust. (2) Using specific subsamples without a coherent criterion for data selection might lead to non-representative findings.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/22201
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 439.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 31 Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0439

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Phone: 031-773 10 00
Web page: http://www.handels.gu.se/econ/
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Related research

Keywords: Tournament; first-mover advantage; psychological pressure; field experiment; soccer; penalty shootouts;

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References

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  1. José Apesteguia & Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2008. "Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment," Working Papers 361, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  2. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Oscar Volij, 2006. "Experientia Docet: Professionals Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 122247000000001050, www.najecon.org.
  3. Dan Ariely & Uri Gneezy & George Loewenstein & Nina Mazar, 2005. "Large stakes and big mistakes," Working Papers 05-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  4. Steven D. Levitt & John A. List & David H. Reiley, Jr., 2009. "What Happens in the Field Stays in the Field: Exploring Whether Professionals Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments," NBER Working Papers 15609, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. John Wooders, 2010. "Does Experience Teach? Professionals and Minimax Play in the Lab," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(3), pages 1143-1154, 05.
  6. John List & David Reiley, 2008. "Field experiments," Artefactual Field Experiments 00091, The Field Experiments Website.
  7. Walker, Mark & Wooders, John & Amir, Rabah, 2011. "Equilibrium play in matches: Binary Markov games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 487-502, March.
  8. P.-A. Chiappori, 2002. "Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1138-1151, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Francesco Feri & Alessandro Innocenti & Paolo Pin, 2011. "Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence from A Randomized Natural Experiment: Comment," Working Papers 2011-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.

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