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Natural Resource Dependency and Quality of Government

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Author Info

  • Anthonsen, Mette

    (The Quality of Government Institute, Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg)

  • Löfgren, Åsa

    ()
    (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)

  • Nilsson, Klas

    (Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg)

Abstract

This paper introduces quality of government rather than regime type as dependent variable in studies of the political effects of natural resources. It consists of two parts. First, it theorizes the role of fiscal dependency of oil and gas rents in relation to three different dimensions of quality of government; low corruption, bureaucratic quality and legal impartiality. Second, it finds significant, negative effects of oil and gas rent dependency on all three dimensions of quality in a sample of 139 states in the period 1984 to 2006. The results hold for inclusion of control variables such as regime type, income, region and religion.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/21512
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 415.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 04 Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0415

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Postal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Phone: 031-773 10 00
Web page: http://www.handels.gu.se/econ/
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Keywords: Oil; gas; corruption; bureaucracy; legal impartiality; large-N;

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  1. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1998. "The Quality of Goverment," NBER Working Papers 6727, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Robinson, James A & Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, Thierry, 2002. "Political Foundations of the Resource Curse," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3422, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Rauch, James E & Evans, Peter B., 1999. "Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC San Diego qt0sb0w38d, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  4. Morrison, Kevin M., 2009. "Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(01), pages 107-138, January.
  5. Lorenzo Pellegrini & Reyer Gerlagh, 2008. "Causes of corruption: a survey of cross-country analyses and extended results," Economics of Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 245-263, July.
  6. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2004. "Institutions and the Resource Curse," DEGIT Conference Papers, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade c009_012, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
  7. Kolstad, Ivar & Wiig, Arne, 2009. "Is Transparency the Key to Reducing Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries?," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 521-532, March.
  8. Philip R. Lane & Aaron Tornell, 1999. "The Voracity Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 22-46, March.
  9. Van Rijckeghem, Caroline & Weder, Beatrice, 2001. "Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 307-331, August.
  10. Carlos Leite & Jens Weidmann, 1999. "Does Mother Nature Corrupt," IMF Working Papers 99/85, International Monetary Fund.
  11. Torvik, Ragnar, 2002. "Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 455-470, April.
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