Natural Resource Dependency and Quality of Government
AbstractThis paper introduces quality of government rather than regime type as dependent variable in studies of the political effects of natural resources. It consists of two parts. First, it theorizes the role of fiscal dependency of oil and gas rents in relation to three different dimensions of quality of government; low corruption, bureaucratic quality and legal impartiality. Second, it finds significant, negative effects of oil and gas rent dependency on all three dimensions of quality in a sample of 139 states in the period 1984 to 2006. The results hold for inclusion of control variables such as regime type, income, region and religion.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 415.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 04 Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Phone: 031-773 10 00
Web page: http://www.handels.gu.se/econ/
More information through EDIRC
Oil; gas; corruption; bureaucracy; legal impartiality; large-N;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- N50 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - General, International, or Comparative
- O13 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
- O43 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
- P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
- Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-12-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2009-12-11 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2009-12-11 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-RES-2009-12-11 (Resource Economics)
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