The Changing Pattern of Amakudari Appointments - The Case of Regional Banks 1991-2000
AbstractAmakudari, or the reemployment of the officials retired from the government into senior management positions in private companies, is one of the informal institutions most frequently mentioned in the literature of Japanese political economy. However, few studies have examined it systematically. Focusing on the reemployment from Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan into regional banks, this study discusses the mechanism of amakudari appointments and its change over time. Four different perspectives (human resource, communication, monitoring and compensation) are presented, and their validity is tested by an empirical analysis with the panel data of 96 regional banks from 1991 to 2000. The result shows that the appointment of a retiree from a ministry at the retirement of a predecessor from the same ministry (chain appointment) is no longer the case. On the other hand, it is also found that amakudari is more likely to occur at more profitable/ safer banks than others, which supports the traditional argument that amakudari is used as a compensation for retired bureaucrats.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The European Institute of Japanese Studies in its series EIJS Working Paper Series with number 187.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 22 Jan 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: The European Institute of Japanese Studies, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Web page: http://www.hhs.se/eijs/
More information through EDIRC
amakudari; financial supervision; Japan; incentives of regulator;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Horiuchi, Akiyoshi & Shimizu, Katsutoshi, 2001. "Did amakudari undermine the effectiveness of regulator monitoring in Japan?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 573-596, March.
- Hassink, Wolter & van Rixtel, Adrian, 1998. "Monitoring the Monitors: Amakudari and the Ex-Post Monitoring of Private Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 1785, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tetsuro Mizoguchi & Nguyen Van Quyen, 2009. "Amakudari: The Post-Retirement Employment of Elite Bureaucrats in Japan," Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series 2009-011, Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nanhee Lee).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.