Monitoring the Monitors: Amakudari and the Ex-Post Monitoring of Private Banks
AbstractThe paper investigates whether the Japanese monetary authorities use post-retirement employment of Ministry of Finance (MoF) and Bank of Japan (BoJ) officials as a policy instrument. The authors also investigate whether industrial groupings (keiretsu) and main banks have monitoring functions. They find that MoF and BoJ retirees do move into banks that perform badly in terms of profitability. Furthermore, the paper concludes that the movement of these retirees into the boards of private banks is positively related to specific main bank relationships. The hypothesis of monitoring by keiretsu is rejected, however. Finally, the paper finds that MoF/BoJ amakudari appointments have a positive impact on the development of lending to risky industries. In particular, this latter finding casts doubts on the credibility of the hypothesis that amakudari is used as an instrument of prudential policy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1785.
Date of creation: Jan 1998
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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- Suzuki, Kenji, 2001. "Effect of Amakudari on Bank Performance in the Post-Bubble Period," EIJS Working Paper Series 136, The European Institute of Japanese Studies.
- Anderson, Christopher W. & Campbell, Terry II, 2004. "Corporate governance of Japanese banks," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 327-354, June.
- Albrecht Rothacher, 2006. "After the banquet: Japan’s power elite revisited," Asia Europe Journal, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 399-416, September.
- Suzuki, Kenji, 2004. "Is Amakudari Changing? The Case of Regional Banks," EIJS Working Paper Series 198, The European Institute of Japanese Studies.
- Suzuki, Kenji, 2004. "The Changing Pattern of Amakudari Appointments - The Case of Regional Banks 1991-2000," EIJS Working Paper Series 187, The European Institute of Japanese Studies.
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