Amakudari: The Post-Retirement Employment of Elite Bureaucrats in Japan
AbstractThis paper analyzes the amakudari practice in Japan. Amakudari refers to situations where government agencies contact the private firms that they regulate, asking them to provide employment for their retiring elite bureaucrats. Upon employment at the private firms, bureaucrats may collude with their former employers to secure lucrative government contracts, avoid regulatory inspections, or obtain preferential treatment. This paper provides an explicit formalization of the implicit collusion between the regulator and the regulated.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program in its series Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series with number 2009-011.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2-15-45, Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo 108-8345
Web page: http://ies.keio.ac.jp/old_project/old/gcoe-econbus/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bulow, Jeremy & Roberts, John, 1989. "The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1060-90, October.
- Bagnoli, M. & Bergstrom, T., 1989.
"Log-Concave Probability And Its Applications,"
89-23, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Yamori, Nobuyoshi, 1998. "Bureaucrat-managers and corporate governance: expense-preference behaviors in Japanese financial institutions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 385-389, December.
- Toke S. Aidt, 2003. "Economic analysis of corruption: a survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(491), pages F632-F652, November.
- Edwards, Franklin R, 1977. "Managerial Objectives in Regulated Industries: Expense-Preference Behavior in Banking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 147-62, February.
- Horiuchi, Akiyoshi & Shimizu, Katsutoshi, 2001. "Did amakudari undermine the effectiveness of regulator monitoring in Japan?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 573-596, March.
- Suzuki, Kenji, 2004. "The Changing Pattern of Amakudari Appointments - The Case of Regional Banks 1991-2000," EIJS Working Paper Series 187, The European Institute of Japanese Studies.
- Asano, Akihito & Eto, Takaharu, 2006. "The paradox of limited deposit insurance under the amakudari practice in the Japanese banking system," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 126-143, February.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Global COE Program Office).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.