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Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Non-linear Utilities

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  • Yiding Feng
  • Jason Hartline
  • Yingkai Li

Abstract

We show that economic conclusions derived from Bulow and Roberts (1989) for linear utility models approximately extend to non-linear utility models. Specifically, we quantify the extent to which agents with non-linear utilities resemble agents with linear utilities, and we show that the approximation of mechanisms for agents with linear utilities approximately extend for agents with non-linear utilities. We illustrate the framework for the objectives of revenue and welfare on non-linear models that include agents with budget constraints, agents with risk aversion, and agents with endogenous valuations. We derive bounds on how much these models resemble the linear utility model and combine these bounds with well-studied approximation results for linear utility models. We conclude that simple mechanisms are approximately optimal for these non-linear agent models.

Suggested Citation

  • Yiding Feng & Jason Hartline & Yingkai Li, 2020. "Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Non-linear Utilities," Papers 2003.00545, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2003.00545
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bulow, Jeremy & Roberts, John, 1989. "The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1060-1090, October.
    2. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2000. "The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 198-233, June.
    3. Yeon‐Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim & Konrad Mierendorff, 2013. "Generalized Reduced‐Form Auctions: A Network‐Flow Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2487-2520, November.
    4. Maskin, Eric S., 2000. "Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 667-681, May.
    5. Shuchi Chawla & Jason Hartline & David Malec & Balasubramanian Sivan, 2010. "Sequential Posted Pricing and Multi-parameter Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 1486, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    7. Pai, Mallesh M. & Vohra, Rakesh, 2014. "Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 383-425.
    8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Robert, Jacques, 1996. "Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 181-186, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Nicole Immorlica & Yingkai Li & Brendan Lucier, 2021. "Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Costly Participation," Papers 2103.03980, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.

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