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EXCLUSIVE SAFEGUARDS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: Subcontracting Agreements in Eastern Europe’s Car Component Industry

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Author Info
Møllgaard, H. Peter (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)
Lorentzen, Jochen (Department of International Economics and Management)
Abstract

We study the rationale for the use of exclusivity to protect transfer of technology in

subcontracting agreements. The legal possibility arises through the EU Notice on

Subcontracting. Empirically, the link between exclusive agreements and technology transfer

among firms in the automotive supply industry in EU candidate countries is surprisingly weak,

although with exclusive-supply or exclusive-buying clauses in subcontracting agreements

upstream transfer of technology is more likely. Exclusive agreements are often reciprocal, and

are typically passed on. Downstream firms are more likely to face and use vertical restraints.

Technology trickles upstream: Multinational final assemblers transfer more technology than

lower-tier suppliers.

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File URL: http://openarchive.cbs.dk/cbsweb/handle/10398/7527
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 10-2002.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2002_010

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Phone: 38 15 25 75
Fax: 38 15 26 65
Email:
Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/econ/
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Related research
Keywords: Transfer of technology; subcontracting; exclusive agreements; automotive supply industry; vertical restraints;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
L62 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Automobiles; Other Transportation Equipment

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dutz, Mark A. & Vagliasindi, Maria, 2000. "Competition policy implementation in transition economies: An empirical assessment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 762-772, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Patrick Rey & Joseph Stiglitz, 1995. "The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 431-451, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1998. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 64-103, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Gonzalez-Diaz, Manuel & Arrunada, Benito & Fernandez, Alberto, 2000. "Causes of subcontracting: evidence from panel data on construction firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 167-187, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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