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EXCLUSIVE SAFEGUARDS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: Subcontracting Agreements in Eastern Europe’s Car Component Industry

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Author Info

  • Møllgaard, H. Peter

    (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)

  • Lorentzen, Jochen

    (Department of International Economics and Management)

Abstract

We study the rationale for the use of exclusivity to protect transfer of technology in subcontracting agreements. The legal possibility arises through the EU Notice on Subcontracting. Empirically, the link between exclusive agreements and technology transfer among firms in the automotive supply industry in EU candidate countries is surprisingly weak, although with exclusive-supply or exclusive-buying clauses in subcontracting agreements upstream transfer of technology is more likely. Exclusive agreements are often reciprocal, and are typically passed on. Downstream firms are more likely to face and use vertical restraints. Technology trickles upstream: Multinational final assemblers transfer more technology than lower-tier suppliers.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 10-2002.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2002_010

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Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Phone: 38 15 25 75
Fax: 38 15 34 99
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Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/econ/
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Related research

Keywords: Transfer of technology; subcontracting; exclusive agreements; automotive supply industry; vertical restraints;

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  1. Dutz, Mark A. & Vagliasindi, Maria, 2000. "Competition policy implementation in transition economies: An empirical assessment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 762-772, May.
  2. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, . "Exclusive Dealing," Working Papers 96008, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  3. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2003. "Intellectual Property: When is it the Best Incentive System?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000532, David K. Levine.
  4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Gonzalez-Diaz, Manuel & Arrunada, Benito & Fernandez, Alberto, 2000. "Causes of subcontracting: evidence from panel data on construction firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 167-187, June.
  6. repec:fth:eeccco:119 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Patrick Rey & Joseph Stiglitz, 1995. "The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 431-451, Autumn.
  8. Kaminski, Bartlomiej & Ng, Francis, 2001. "Trade and production fragmentation : Central European economies in European Union networks of production and marketing," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2611, The World Bank.
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