Institutional Design and Antitrust Evidentiary Standards
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Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04136686
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Other versions of this item:
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2014. "Institutional Design and Antitrust Evidentiary Standards," Post-Print hal-01668447, HAL.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2015. "Institutional Design and Antitrust Evidentiary Standards," EconomiX Working Papers 2015-3, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Bourjade, Sylvain & Rey, Patrick & seabright, paul, 2009. "Private antitrust enforcement in the presence of pre-trial bargaining," MPRA Paper 34840, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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Cited by:
- Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2018.
"Private enforcement, corruption, and antitrust design,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 284-307.
- Peter Grajzl & Andrzej Baniak, 2015. "Private Enforcement, Corruption, and Antitrust Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 5602, CESifo.
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More about this item
Keywords
Antitrust; public and private enforcement; evidentiary standard.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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