Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary
AbstractThis notes reports part of a larger study of "petty corruption" by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition for approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all the required approvals. In a dynamic game model we investigate (1) the multiplicity of equilibria, (2) the equilibria that are "socially efficient", and (3) the equilibria that maximize the total expected bureaucrat's bribe income. We compare these results with those for the case in which entrepreneurs apply directly to the bureaucrats.
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Date of creation: Jul 2007
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petty corruption ; intermediaries ; game theory;
Other versions of this item:
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner, 2009. "Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 45-57, April.
- Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane & Majumdar, Mukul & Radner, Roy, 2008. "Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption with an Intermediary," Working Papers, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics 08-11, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
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- repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00672963 is not listed on IDEAS
- Mishra, Ajit & Samuel, Andrew, 2013. "Corruption and Hold-Up : The Role of Intermediaries," Department of Economics Working Papers, University of Bath, Department of Economics 37907, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
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