On the efficiency of ‘single window’
AbstractIn many countries, the process of obtaining government approval for different projects involves interaction with multiple government agencies at various levels. This often makes the approval process inefficient by unnecessary lengthening it. In this paper we study the effect of a re-organization of the approval process towards making it a single window clearance system, on the efficiency of the entire process. We have used the expected queue length and the expected waiting time in the system at the stochastic steady state as measures of inefficiency of an approval system.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 43 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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