Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption with an Intermediary
AbstractThis note reports part of a larger study of "petty corruption" by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition of approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all of the required approvals. In a dynamic game model we investigate (1) the multiplicity of equilibria, (2) the equilibria that are "socially efficient," and (3) the equilibria that maximize the total expected bureaucrats' bribe income. We compare these results with those for the case in which entrepreneurs apply directly to the bureaucrats.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics in its series Working Papers with number 08-11.
Date of creation: Dec 2008
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- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner, 2009. "Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 45-57, April.
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Radner Roy, 2007. "Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary," PSE Working Papers halshs-00587715, HAL.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
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