Strategic Analysis of Influence Peddling
AbstractThis paper analyzes "Influence Peddling" with interaction between human capital transfer and collusion-building aspects in a model, in which each government official regulates multiple firms simultaneously. We show that (i) there exists an "optimal" division rule for collusion between a sequence of "qualified" regulators and a firm; (ii) as the regulators increasingly benefit from the collusion, they strictly decrease regulation rates for the firm under collusion while strictly increasing regulation rates for a firm not under collusion; and (iii) post-government-employment restrictions are not "effective" policies, and an alternative policy can be suggested.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics in its series Working Papers with number 11-04.
Date of creation: Jul 2011
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 402 Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853
Phone: (607) 255-9901
Fax: (607) 255-2818
Web page: http://www.arts.cornell.edu/econ/CAE/workingpapers.html
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-09-05 (Business Economics)
- NEP-REG-2011-09-05 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Yeon-Koo Che, 1995. "Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 378-397, Autumn.
- Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane & Majumdar, Mukul & Radner, Roy, 2007.
"Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats,"
Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 351-367, July.
- Roy Radner & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Makul Majumdar, 2004. "Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption: Entrepreneurs and Bureaucrats," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics 04-22, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner, 2005. "Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590706, HAL.
- Martimort, David, 1999. "The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(4), pages 929-47, October.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M & Maskin, Eric S, 1990.
"Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players,"
Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 555-73, October.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Working papers 474, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Maskin, Eric & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Scholarly Articles 3226950, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps & E. Maskin, 1998. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 608, David K. Levine.
- Eckert, Ross D, 1981. "The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissioners," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 113-20, April.
- John K.-H Quah, 2007. "The Comparative Statics of Constrained Optimization Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 75(2), pages 401-431, 03.
- Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal, 2002. "Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 583-601, March.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
- Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987.
"Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press,
MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May.
- Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
- Kimberly Ann Elliott, 1997. "Corruption and the Global Economy," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 12, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.