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A simple theory of the optimal number of immigrants

Author

Listed:
  • Chi-Chur Chao

    (Department of Economics - Chinese University of Hong Kong - CUHK - The Chinese University of Hong Kong [Hong Kong])

  • Bharat R. Hazari

    (CUHK - City University of Hong Kong [Hong Kong])

  • Jean-Pierre Laffargue

    (CEPREMAP - Centre pour la recherche économique et ses applications - ECO ENS-PSL - Département d'économie de l'ENS-PSL - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres, PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

This paper develops a simple model to explain two stylised facts about immigration. First, some countries have a low ratio of migrants in their population, while other wealthy countries have a high number of migrants. In fact such migrants are of the same order of magnitude as their domestic workforce. Secondly, migrants are often segregated in jobs. The domestic residents do not wish to be employed in these jobs due to their unattractive working conditions and payments. The model assumes that domestic residents are all identical in terms of their skills and wealth and furthermore that native and foreign workers have the same skills. However, foreign migrants cannot be excluded from the use of public services, the quality of which decreases due to congestion created or enhanced by migrants. On the basis of our model we show that the stylised facts are consistent with an optimal immigration policy, defined by domestic residents who have neither altruistic feelings nor ethnic prejudice toward foreign migrants.

Suggested Citation

  • Chi-Chur Chao & Bharat R. Hazari & Jean-Pierre Laffargue, 2008. "A simple theory of the optimal number of immigrants," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586821, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00586821
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00586821
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Facchini, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria, 2006. "Individual Attitudes towards Immigrants: Welfare-State Determinants Across Countries," IZA Discussion Papers 2127, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
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    3. Malchow-Møller, Nikolaj & Munch, Jakob R. & Schroll, Sanne & Skaksen, Jan Rose, 2006. "Attitudes Towards Immigration: Does Economic Self-Interest Matter?," IZA Discussion Papers 2283, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano & Giovanni Peri, 2005. "Rethinking the Gains from Immigration: Theory and Evidence from the U.S," NBER Working Papers 11672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim & Swagel, Phillip, 2002. "Tax burden and migration: a political economy theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 167-190, August.
    6. Tito Boeri & Herbert Brücker, 2005. "Why are Europeans so tough on migrants? [‘What a difference a constant makes: how predictable are international migration flows?’ in OECD]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 20(44), pages 630-703.
    7. Berry, R Albert & Soligo, Ronald, 1969. "Some Welfare Aspects of International Migration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(5), pages 778-794, Sept./Oct.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fujita, M. & Weber, S., 2010. "Immigration Quotas in the Globalized Economy," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 7, pages 10-23.

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    Keywords

    congestion; immigration; public good; segregation;
    All these keywords.

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