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Theoretical perspectives on the new era of central banking

Author

Listed:
  • Clément Fontan Fontan

    (GU - Göteborgs Universitet = University of Gothenburg)

  • Emmanuel Carré

    (UBS Vannes - Université de Bretagne Sud - Vannes - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud)

  • Guillaume L'Oeillet

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The role played by central banks in our economies has changed drastically since 2007, when they became key players in the stabilisation of financial and economic systems. In addition to gaining new competences, their policies strayed increasingly into the political realm and became more controversial. This new era of central banking has revived scholarly debates and vibrant future research perspectives on both dimensions of their independence: towards political and financial institutions. In this article, we review the theoretical debates between economists, political scientists, economic sociologists, and political philosophers on this issue.

Suggested Citation

  • Clément Fontan Fontan & Emmanuel Carré & Guillaume L'Oeillet, 2018. "Theoretical perspectives on the new era of central banking," Post-Print halshs-01866838, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01866838
    DOI: 10.1057/s41253-018-0067-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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