Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule
AbstractThe cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which re- quires the cooperation of di erent authorities, is a problematic issue, espe- cially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-de ned. Following Ni and Wang  we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsi- bility of each region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing costs \fairly" and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility of regions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. in its series ThE Papers with number 13/03.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 27 Feb 2013
Date of revision:
Cost allocation; waste river; responsibility; characterization;
Other versions of this item:
- Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & MarÃa GÃ³mez-RÃºa & Elena Molis, 2013. "Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de EconomÃa - Universidad PÃºblica de Navarra, Departamento de EconomÃa - Universidad PÃºblica de Navarra 1301, Departamento de EconomÃa - Universidad PÃºblica de Navarra.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CWA-2013-03-16 (Central & Western Asia)
- NEP-ENV-2013-03-16 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-03-16 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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