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Sharing a polluted river

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  • Ni, Debing
  • Wang, Yuntong

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4MC0TG3-1/2/5a39cf68fa00ee0679c8139ae89765c0
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 60 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 176-186

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:60:y:2007:i:1:p:176-186

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References

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  1. Ambec, Stefan & Sprumont, Yves, 2000. "Sharing a River," Cahiers de recherche 0006, GREEN.
  2. Moulin, Herve, 2002. "Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 289-357 Elsevier.
  3. Barret, Scott & DEC, 1994. "Conflict and cooperation in managing international water resources," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1303, The World Bank.
  4. Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1975. "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 966-77, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Rene van den Brink & Chris Dietz, 2012. "Multi-Player Agents in Cooperative TU-Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-001/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  2. Nikola Tarashev & Mathias Drehmann, 2011. "Measuring the systemic importance of interconnected banks," BIS Working Papers 342, Bank for International Settlements.
  3. Ambec, Stefan & Ehlers, Lars, 2008. "Sharing a river among satiable agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-50, September.
  4. Beard, Rodney, 2011. "The river sharing problem: A review of the technical literature for policy economists," MPRA Paper 34382, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Brink, R. van den & Herings, P.J.J. & Laan, G. van der & Talman, A.J.J., 2013. "The Average Tree Permission Value for Games with a Permission Tree," Discussion Paper 2013-001, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Martínez, Ricardo, 2014. "Cost allocation in asymmetric trees," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 237(3), pages 975-987.

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