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Implementaing Market Access

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Author Info

  • Krishna, K
  • Roy, S
  • Thursby, M

Abstract

The outcome of trade policies to increase access for foreign firms to the home country's market is shown to be sensitive to the implementation procedure used. The importance of the timing of moves between governement and firms is highlighted by focusing on taxes and subsidies to implement minimum market share requirements.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Purdue University, Krannert School of Management - Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER) in its series Papers with number 96-003.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:purkib:96-003

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Purdue University, Center for International Business Education and Research, Krannert Graduate School of Management, 1310 Krannert Building West Lafayette, Indiana 47907-1310.
Web page: http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/
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Related research

Keywords: INTERNATIONAL TRADE ; COMMERCIAL POLICY ; TAXATION ; SUBSIDIES ; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ; FOREIGN INVESTMENTS;

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Eaton, Jonathan & Grossman, Gene M, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406, May.
  2. Brainard, S.L. & Martimort, D., 1992. "Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletely Informed Policymakers," Papers 92.277, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  3. Gruenspecht, Howard K., 1988. "Export subsidies for differentiated products," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3-4), pages 331-344, May.
  4. Kala Krishna, 1989. "The Case of the Vanishing Revenues: Auction Quotas with Monopoly," NBER Working Papers 2840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Greaney, Theresa M., 1996. "Import now! An analysis of market-share voluntary import expansions (VIEs)," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 149-163, February.
  6. Pinelopi K. Goldberg & Michael M. Knetter, 1995. "Causes and Consequences of the Export Enhancement Program for Wheat," NBER Working Papers 5359, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Kowalczyk, Carsten, 1994. "Monopoly and trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-2), pages 177-186, February.
  8. repec:fth:osakae:304 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Ethier, W.J. & Horn, H., 1993. "Results-Oriented Trade Policy," ISER Discussion Paper 0304, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  10. Douglas A. Irwin, 1996. "Trade Policies and the Semiconductor Industry," NBER Chapters, in: The Political Economy of American Trade Policy, pages 11-72 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Neil Bjorksten, 1994. "Voluntary Import Expansions and Voluntary Export Restraints in an Oligopoly Model with Capacity Constraints," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(2), pages 446-57, May.
  12. Kala Krishna, 1985. "Trade Restrictions as Facilitating Practices," NBER Working Papers 1546, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Carmichael, Calum M., 1987. "The control of export credit subsidies and its welfare consequences," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 1-19, August.
  14. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
  16. Douglas A. Irwin, 1994. "Trade Politics and the Semi-conductor Industry," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 92, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  17. Dinopoulos, Elias & Kreinin, Mordechai E, 1990. "An Analysis of Import Expansion Policies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(1), pages 99-108, January.
  18. Kala Krishna & Suddhasatwa Roy & Marie Thursby, 1997. "Procompetitive Market Access," NBER Working Papers 6184, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kala Krishna & Suddhasatwa Roy & Marie Thursby, 2001. "Can subsidies for MARs be procompetitive?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(1), pages 212-224, February.
  2. Krishna, Kala & Morgan, John, 1998. "Implementing results-oriented trade policies: The case of the US-Japanese auto parts dispute," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(8), pages 1443-1467, September.
  3. Byron Gangnes & Craig Parsons, 2004. "Have U.S.-Japan Trade Agreements Made a Difference?," Working Papers 08-2004, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
  4. Greaney, Theresa M., 2000. "Righting past wrongs: can import promotion policies counter hysteresis from past trade protection in the presence of switching costs?," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 211-227, September.
  5. Kala Krishna & Suddhasatwa Roy & Marie Thursby, 1997. "Procompetitive Market Access," NBER Working Papers 6184, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Larry D. Qiu & Barbara J. Spencer, 2001. "Keiretsu and Relationship-Specific Investment: Implications for Market-Opening Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 8279, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Ju, Jiandong & Krishna, Kala, 2000. "Welfare and market access effects of piecemeal tariff reform," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 305-316, August.
  8. Barbara J. Spencer & Larry D. Qiu, 2000. "Keiretsu and Relationship-Specific Investment: A Barrier to Trade?," NBER Working Papers 7572, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Thierry Verdier, 1998. "Results-oriented versus rules-oriented trade policies:: A theoretical survey," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 733-744, May.

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